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CONVENIENCE AND LOWER PRICES,
BUT AT WHAT COST?:
WATCHING CLOSELY AS DISCOUNT
SUPERSTORES CREEP INTO MANHATTAN
Kathleen Codey*
INTRODUCTION
The word “sprawl” evokes images of once rural areas littered
with housing developments, strip malls, and winding highways.1
Located within and between these strip malls and highways lie
what retail industry insiders call “big box retailers.”2 Big box
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2005; B.A., Dartmouth College, 2002. For
all of the help I received during this process, I would like to thank my family for
their love and support, my roommates and friends for making me laugh and
keeping me sane, and Dave Weiss for his uncanny ability to sense what I need
and make every day more fun than the last.
1
Edward H. Ziegler, Urban Sprawl, Growth Management and Sustainable
Development in the United States: Thoughts on the Sentimental Quest for a New
Middle Landscape, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 26, 29 (2003). Geographers and
sociologists traditionally define “sprawl” as “low-density suburban and exurban
growth that expands in an unlimited and noncontiguous (“leapfrog”) manner
outward from the built-up core of a metropolitan area.” Id. See also J. Celeste
Sakowicz, Note, Urban Sprawl: Florida’s and Maryland’s Approaches, 19 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 377, 381 (2004) (describing sprawl as a “land use
pattern of sporadic, inconsistent development that occurs away from the center
of the metropolis”).
2
William E. Roper & Elizabeth Humstone, Wal-Mart in Vermont—The
Case Against Sprawl, 22 VT. L. REV. 755, 755 (1998); Jonathan Moore Peterson,
Taming the Sprawlmart: Using an Antitrust Arsenal to Further Historic
Preservation Goals, 27 URB. LAW. 333, 335 (1995) (describing how big box
retailers are characterized by their “economies of scale, warehouse-type stores,
and low prices”). These stores are also criticized as being “shopper-snatchers”
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retailers situate themselves in warehouse-type buildings that can
occupy between 90,000 and 200,000 square feet.3 These stores
either specialize in a single product line or sell a variety of
products at discounted prices.4 In rural and suburban areas, such
stores are surrounded by acres of parking lots that are situated
close to major roads and highway interchanges to maximize
consumer traffic.5 Offering lower prices that draw consumers and
revenue incentives that attract state and local governments,6
national chain stores position themselves in an attempt to capture a
and “category-killers.” See Jane Holtz Kay, Ticky-Tacky Big Boxes, THE
NATION, available at http://www.janeholtzkay.com/Articles/boxes.html (coining
the phrase “shopper-snatchers”); American Studies at Eastern Connecticut
University, Shopping Mall Studies, General Terminology (2004), at
http://www.easternct.edu/depts/amerst/MallsTerms.htm (defining “category
killers” as “large national chain store[s] specializing in one line of products,
such as hardware and home improvements, office supplies, or toys, that can
overwhelm both smaller and more diverse competitors because of its size,
variety of merchandise, and prices”).
3
Roper & Humstone, supra note 2, at 755. See Constance E. Beaumont &
Leslie Tucker, Big-Box Sprawl (And How to Control It), 43 MUN. LAW. 7, 9
(2002) (“The U.S. had only five square feet of retail space per person in 1980;
today, that number is 20 square feet.”).
4
See American Studies at Eastern Connecticut University, Shopping Mall
Studies, General Terminology (2004), at http://www.easternct.edu/depts/
amerst/MallsTerms.htm (defining “big box” as a “large stand-alone store that
specializes in a single line of products” or a “no-frills discount stor[e] that sell[s]
in volume”) (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). Common stores that specialize in a
single product line include: Home Depot, which sells home improvement items;
Best Buy, a discount electronics retailer; and chain drug stores such as CVS or
Rite Aid. Discount retailers who diversify their product offerings include Kmart,
Wal-Mart, and Target.
5
Roper & Humstone, supra note 2, at 755.
6
Justin Shoemaker, The Smalling of America?: Growth Management
Statutes and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 48 DUKE L.J. 891, 900 (1999)
(highlighting the financial and tax-related benefits to big box development). In
communities with lower tax bases, large retailers with even larger profits offer
an opportunity for counties and towns to significantly increase their tax
revenues. Stephen Kinzer, Wal-Mart’s Big-City Plans Stall Again, N.Y. TIMES,
May 6, 2004, at A27. The allure of extra tax revenue and the promise of added
jobs can be enough for towns to ignore negative characteristics common to this
kind of development. Id.
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substantial portion of the local market.7
But lower prices and new job opportunities are not the only
effects these retailers have on communities, regardless of how hard
a corporate public relations department tries to persuade residents
otherwise.8 In rural areas, large-scale retail development spurs
waves of secondary development, including new roads, sewage
systems, and power stations.9 A significant quantity of literature
details the deterioration of the picturesque town center in New
England in the face of this development.10 In small northeastern
7

Shoemaker, supra note 6, at 900 (stating that the economic pressure to
allow big box retail development is difficult for towns to resist).
8
See Ikea Brochure, “Welcome to Brooklyn . . . Like No Other Place in the
World!” (2003) (stating that between 500-600 new “permanent, high-quality
jobs” will be created and there will be “tremendous benefits to the community”)
(on file with author). But see Shoemaker, supra note 6, at 892 (arguing that
“[s]prawl brings, among other things, strains on infrastructure, pollution, traffic
congestion, the decline of city centers, the death of small towns, and the
destruction of the landscape”); Beaumont & Tucker, supra note 3, at 7 (“In the
view of many, big-box stores impose hidden costs that don’t appear on the price
tags of the products they sell: traffic congestion; loss of trees, open space and
farmland; displaced small businesses; substitution of jobs that support families
with low-paying jobs that don’t; air and water pollution; dying downtowns with
vacant buildings; abandoned shopping centers; a degraded sense of community;
and sprawl.”).
9
Roper & Humstone, supra note 2, at 773 (arguing that this kind of
secondary development around retail centers can actually increase costs for
taxpayers).
10
See RICHARD V. FRANCAVIGLIA, MAIN STREET REVISITED: TIME, SPACE,
AND IMAGE BUILDING IN SMALL-TOWN AMERICA (1996) (detailing the effects of
sprawl on New England towns and villages). See also David Weiss, Small Town
Identity, Power, and Sprawl: The Local Geopolitics of Wal-Mart Development
in Northern Vermont 26 (2002) (unpublished B.A. honors thesis, Dartmouth
College) (on file with the Dartmouth College Library) (detailing two Vermont
towns’ battles for and against a proposed Wal-Mart); Jessica E. Jay, Note, The
“Malling” of Vermont: Can the “Growth Center” Designation Save the
Traditional Village from Suburban Sprawl?, 21 VT. L. REV. 929 (1997)
(describing how Vermont and New England village town centers are at risk from
unchecked development by big box retailers); Peterson, supra note 2, at 382
(marveling at the fact that the National Trust for Historic Preservation placed the
entire state of Vermont on its list of endangered places due to the threat it faces
from sprawl).
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towns, sprawling development is linked to a declining sense of
community, as more residents choose to shop on highways than on
Main Streets.11 In their quest to beat the competition by offering
the lowest prices possible, national retailers such as Wal-Mart
often destroy their local competition entirely.12 Whether located in
rural, suburban, or urban areas, national chain stores have an
undeniable economic impact on small, independent retailers.13 The
big box battle is similarly fought in every retail sector and touches
every store owner who offers the same goods or services as a big
box retailer.14
Beginning in the 1990s, as the pace of residential and
commercial sprawl quickened, towns and private citizens
discovered ways to fight back the onslaught of big box
development. States passed environmental and growth-control
legislation, towns enacted tailored zoning ordinances, and smaller
retailers sued national chain stores for violations of state price
11

See Jay, supra note 10, for a complete discussion of sprawl’s impact on
Vermont villages.
12
See Wal-Mart Stores, About Wal-Mart, The Wal-Mart Culture, Pricing
Philosophy [hereinafter Wal-Mart Pricing Philosophy] (outlining Wal-Mart’s
commitment to beating the prices of competition), at http://www.walmartstores.
com/wmstore/wmstores/HomePage.jsp (last visited Feb. 14, 2005); See SHARON
ZUKIN, POINT OF PURCHASE 28 (2004) [hereinafter POINT OF PURCHASE]
(alleging that “[t]he hulking glass boxes of superstores reflect the ghosts of a
thousand corner groceries”).
13
See ROBERT H. FREILICH, FROM SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH:
SUCCESSFUL LEGAL, PLANNING, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS 23 (Leslie
Hollmann ed., American Bar Ass’n 1999) (noting that businesses are not
immune to sprawl). In one town, a local hardware store manager commented
that “[s]ince Home Depot opened in the Pittsburg (CA) area, the local True
Value store, in business since the ‘30s has disappeared, two local nurseries, a
flooring store, and a landscape supply yard is also gone or sold.” A Citizen’s
View of Home Depot: Not in Our Hometown: The Orange Wars, at
http://www.sprawl-busters.com/hometown.html (1997).
14
See Glenn Collins, Decks and the City, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2004, at B1.
This article, published two days before the Flatiron location of The Home Depot
was to open, features an interview with an independent locksmith regarding his
reaction to the grand opening. Id. The locksmith expressed concern about his
business’s chances of survival because The Home Depot has priced its services
lower than those of the locksmith. Id.
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discrimination laws.15 Despite these efforts, large, national retailers
continue to dominate the marketplace, putting even the most
resilient merchants out of business.
Notably, while rural and suburban areas have attempted to
blockade further development and mitigate its current effects,16
urban centers such as Chicago and New York have welcomed this
same development with open arms.17 The Home Depot opened its
sixteenth store in New York City on September 10, 2004, and its
seventeenth location on December 16, 2004, both to much
fanfare.18 Located in Manhattan’s Flatiron and Midtown
neighborhoods, the new stores span 83,000 and 108,000 square
feet, respectively, and follow Home Depot’s “urban neighborhood”
store format.19 Tom Taylor, president of Home Depot’s Eastern
Division, states that the new stores “will meet a huge untapped
demand for home improvement products and services in
15

See Peterson, supra note 2 (describing private federal antitrust litigation,
state historical preservation laws, and local zoning plans).
16
See Jay, supra note 10, at 943-54, for a complete discussion of the
options available to towns and states wishing to slow the spread of sprawl.
17
See Press Release, Home Depot, Home Depot Announces its Second
Manhattan Store (Sept. 23, 2003), available at http://ir.homedepot.com/Release
Detail.cfm?ReleaseID=118589 (stating that the Midtown store will be located at
984 Third Avenue between 58th and 59th Streets). The lower Manhattan
location will be 32 West 23rd Street near Fifth Avenue. Id. Although the
Chicago City Council recently voted against changing city zoning regulations
that would allow a second proposed Wal-Mart, the Chicago City Council
approved a zoning change in May, 2004 that cleared the way for construction of
a Wal-Mart in its West Side neighborhood. Wal-Mart Halts Chicago Store,
RETAIL MERCHANDISER, Sept. 1, 2004, at http://www.retail-merchandiser.com/
retailmerchandiser/headlines/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1000622363.
18
Press Release, Home Depot, The Home Depot to Open First Manhattan
Store on Friday (Sept. 9, 2004), available at http://ir.homedepot.com/
ReleaseDetail.cfm?PrintPage=yes&ReleaseID=142842; Press Release, Home
Depot, Act II: The Home Depot Takes Center Stage With Second Manhattan
Store (Dec. 16, 2004), available at http://ir.homedepot.com/ReleaseDetail.
cfm?ReleaseID=150678.
19
Id. The “urban neighborhood” format means that the store will carry
products specifically geared to the urban lifestyle of Manhattan residents. Id.
The store’s stock includes fewer construction materials and more furnishings
than a typical suburban store. Id.
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Manhattan.”20 The “untapped” Manhattan home improvement
market to which Taylor refers, however, contains 236 stores within
a five-mile radius of the Midtown location; eleven of the stores are
located within a one-mile radius of the new location.21 Similarly,
the five-mile radius of the Flatiron store contains 267 home
improvement stores, eleven of which are in a one-mile radius of
the Flatiron location.22 If the experiences of independent retailers
in suburban and rural areas are any indication, independent
hardware and home improvement stores in New York City may
soon die a slow financial death that will unalterably change
Manhattan’s retail landscape, impact neighborhood character, and
harm the city’s economy.23
This note focuses on the uphill battle that confronts New York
City’s small business retailers and residents in the face of a
potential overhaul of the city’s retail structure and culture. Given
that big box retailers have been eyeing urban areas for years, it is
likely that other retailers will follow Home Depot to Manhattan,
intensifying and diversifying the impact on the city’s small
businesses.24 Part I of this note describes the unique features and
20

Id.
Yellowpages.com, available at http://www.yellowpages.com (last visited
Oct. 27, 2004). In order to conduct this query, I used a store search by
“Distance,” entered the address of the Midtown location, entered the category
“hardware” and set the search radius to 5 miles, then 1 mile.
22
Yellowpages.com, available at http://www.yellowpages.com (last visited
Oct. 27, 2004). In order to conduct this query, I used a store search by
“Distance,” entered the address of the Flatiron location, entered the category
“hardware” and set the search radius to 5 miles, then 1 mile.
23
See Kay, supra, note 2. Kay writes that superstores “negate planning and
drain cities of their very citiness—the complex web of shops, restaurants, and
small scale enterprises that support the vitality and diversity of street life and
make urban institutions viable.” Id.; AL NORMAN, SLAM DUNKING WAL-MART
(1999), available at http://www.sprawl-busters.com/caseagainstsprawl.html
(noting that saturated retail markets deteriorate the economy).
24
Brannon Boswell & Alex McGrath, We’ll Take Manhattan, RETAIL
TRAFFIC, Vol. 32, May 1, 2003, at 100. Of all urban markets, retailers have been
especially hesitant to enter the Manhattan market. Id. Retailers often cite high
rents, lack of suitable space, logistical problems such as traffic, and NIMBYism
(“Not In My Back-yard”) of Manhattan residents as the sources of their
reluctance. Id. Depending on how well The Home Depot fares in Manhattan,
21
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attributes of New York City that merit vigorous protection by the
mayor, city agencies, and the New York State legislature. Part II
discusses the historical underpinnings and present uses of zoning
law as a means of controlling land development. Part III examines
federal and state efforts to promote environmentally-conscious
decision making by federal, state, and regional planners in the
evaluation of proposed development projects. Part IV explores the
background of federal and state antitrust law and discusses the
ways in which state antitrust laws have been used to address the
threats to small businesses posed by large national retailers. Part V
discusses the limitations of each of the legal options available to
New York City in its fight against big box retailers. Finally, with
an emphasis on the need for a new statutory scheme in New York
State, Part VI outlines the means by which other states have
stemmed the tide of retail invasion and suggests that New York
City might do the same by passing a stricter antitrust statute. This
note concludes that national big box retailers will cause more harm
than good to New York City’s residents and that their entrance into
the urban market should be closely scrutinized.25
I. THE CHANGING RETAIL LANDSCAPE
Manhattan boasts a diverse and vibrant retail sector in which
small businesses remain vulnerable to the entrance of additional
national chain retailers.26 Although national chain retailing had its
start many miles from New York City, industry leaders have
established themselves as market-changing forces that impact

however, the retailer may allay fears and attract increased interest from other
retailers. Id.
25
Arguments in favor of the entrance of Wal-Marts and other big box
retailers into local retail markets often focus on the jobs that these stores bring,
their convenience, and their ability to offer lower prices for goods. See Diane
Cardwell, Suburban Retailing for the New Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2004,
at B1 (describing how some Brooklyn big box retailers “represent long-overdue
amenities and convenience, in addition to the promise of jobs”).
26
See infra Part I.B. (discussing the Manhattan retail landscape and the
influx of big box retailers).
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communities wherever their stores are built.27 This section profiles
the beginnings of “big box” retailing and traces the development of
Manhattan’s retail economy through the present time in order to
provide context for the potential impact of further retail chain
development on the borough of Manhattan.
A. The Trend of Big Box Retailing
In 1962, Sam Walton opened the first Wal-Mart store in
Arkansas, marking the beginning of a new era in retailing.28
Although Kmart and Target also opened their first outposts that
same year, Wal-Mart’s unique corporate philosophies established it
as the leader in the discount retailing business.29 Sam Walton
expanded his chain of variety stores to compete with the regional
discount retailers of the 1960s who were cutting into his market.30
In doing so, he took charge of the retail market by building
discount stores that advanced a bargain culture and an emphasis on
community.31 Together, these stores “ushered in a new order of
shopping.”32 Unlike the department stores already in existence,
these discount retailers targeted the middle-income shopper and
27

See infra Part I.A. (summarizing a study conducted to analyze the
economic impact of big box retailers on urban communities). See also supra
notes 8-14 (describing big box retail impacts on rural communities).
28
See Wal-Mart Stores, About Wal-Mart, The Wal-Mart Culture, The
Story of Wal-Mart [hereinafter Story of Wal-Mart] (stating that the first WalMart opened in Rogers, Arkansas in 1962), at http://www.walmartstores.com/
wmstore/wmstores/HomePage.jsp (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
29
See id. When Wal-Mart went public in 1970 it received the funds to
rapidly spread across the nation and establish a toehold over its competitors. Id.
See also POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 82 (noting that Sam Walton
instituted a unique corporate strategy involving heavy employee oversight, a nofrills corporate policy that applied to employees and store décor, and a heavyhanded management style).
30
See The Story of Wal-Mart, supra note 28 (describing how Sam Walton
wished to compete with larger regional chain stores).
31
POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 80 (noting that in “Wal-Mart’s
mythology . . . a discount store is a space of community as well as of bargain
culture”).
32
Id.

CODEY MACROED FINAL 2-18-05.DOC

3/7/2005 6:59 PM

MANAGING RETAIL SPRAWL IN MANHATTAN

257

offered brand name products at bargain prices in a convenient,
one-stop-shopping setting.33 Wal-Mart currently boasts annual
sales of more than a quarter trillion dollars and stands as the
world’s largest company, employing 1.3 million workers who
serve an estimated 100 million customers each week.34
Economists and urban planners have documented the notable
impact of large national chain stores on the basic economics of the
retail industry and city life generally.35 Stores such as Wal-Mart,
Home Depot, Target, and their counterparts sell the same or
substantially similar items at consistently low prices.36 In contrast
to the product originality heralded by smaller stores, national chain
retailers emphasize the quantity of sales and aim to sell the greatest
number of items possible in order to generate revenue.37 The mass
sale of similar products is enabled by negotiations between large
nationwide retailers and suppliers. Through supplier arrangements,
large, nationwide retailers can negotiate reduced prices from
suppliers and, in turn, can price their inventories at lower amounts

33

Id. at 83-84. “From Woolworth’s to Wal-Mart, these stores have
encouraged us to think ‘low prices—every day’ is a universal human right.” Id.
at 84.
34
Andy Serwer et al., The Waltons: Inside America’s Richest Family,
FORTUNE, Nov. 15, 2004, at 86; Wal-Mart Stores, News Center, Facts, Photos,
and General Information, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. at a Glance, at
http://www.walmartstores.com/wmstore/wmstores/HomePage.jsp
(providing
statistics for the number of Wal-Mart employees and customers).
35
See Mark Jacobson, Supersize City: How could it be there are more
McDonalds here than anywhere else?, NEW YORK, May 10, 2004, at 30
(lamenting the influx of national retailers and restaurants into Manhattan);
POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 63 (discussing how big box stores sell
things you can get anywhere, but at a lower price).
36
See Sam’s Way, at http://www.walmart.com/cservice/aw_samsway.gsp?
NavMode=9 (assuring Wal-Mart customers that the company will pass along
savings to them, and offer their assortment of products at “Every Day Low
Prices”).
37
See Wal-Mart Pricing Philosophy, supra note 12 (describing Wal-Mart’s
commitment towards striving for a high volume of sales to make up for
discounted prices); POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 63 (stating that
discount stores are “places where you don’t shop for something special that you
can’t find anywhere else: you shop for the lowest prices”).
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than their smaller, regional competitors.38
Attracted by the lower prices enabled by supplier
arrangements, consumers frequently elect to shop at large national
chain stores instead of smaller local retailers. By way of example,
the consumer who once shopped at the neighborhood hardware
store for paint or at the drug store for Tylenol knows that the
product will be identical whether purchased from small retailer X
or big chain store Y. As a result, the consumer will buy the product
where it costs less, usually at chain store Y.39 Similarly, the
consumer who once paid a premium for an original piece of
clothing may sacrifice his desire for uniqueness for the “right
price,” settling instead on an imitation design.40 The pricing
schemes of national chain retailers affect even the most rooted
competitors and frequently drive smaller competitors out of the
market.41
This phenomenon is especially noticeable in the retail clothing
industry.42 Since the advent of the discount superstore, “retail
merchants have been torn between marketing to shoppers’ interest
in low prices and to their emotional identification with specific
brands.”43 Many retailers have gone out of business, unable to

38

See Anthony Bianco & Wendy Zellner, Low prices are great. But WalMart’s dominance creates problems—for suppliers, workers, communities and
even American culture; Is Wal-Mart Too Powerful?, BUS. WK., Oct. 6, 2003, at
100, available at 2003 WL 62195858 (“Wal-Mart has relentlessly wrung tens of
billions of dollars in cost efficiencies out of the retail supply chain, passing the
larger part of the savings along to shoppers as bargain prices.”); Jay, supra note
10, at 941 (stating that neighborhood “mom and pop” stores have difficulty
matching the price and selection of larger retailers).
39
See Bianco & Zellner, supra note 38. Bianco & Zellner describe how
Wal-Mart passes along savings to customers and is then rewarded by seeing 135
million shoppers per week shop in its stores. Id.
40
POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 63 (noting that discount stores
“are places where you don’t shop for something special that you can’t find
anywhere else: you shop for the lowest prices”).
41
See Bianco & Zellner, supra note 38. For every Wal-Mart supercenter
that opens in the next 5 years, two other supermarkets will close. Id.
42
See POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 101.
43
Id.

CODEY MACROED FINAL 2-18-05.DOC

3/7/2005 6:59 PM

MANAGING RETAIL SPRAWL IN MANHATTAN

259

compete with the low prices of Target and Wal-Mart.44 A study
commissioned by one Chicago neighborhood facing future “big
box” development highlights the economic impact of retail
development on local communities.45 The study compared the
economic impact on the local community of ten local businesses to
the impact of an equal number of chain store competitors.46 The
study concluded that the apparent positive economic impacts of
chain stores on the community disappear when a municipality
accounts for commonly-ignored factors such as revenue and square
footage.47 According to the study, for every $100 that a consumer
spends at a chain store, $43 will remain in the local economy.48 By
contrast, for every $100 that a consumer spends at a local business,
$73 will remain in the local economy.49 The study concluded that
locally-owned businesses offer communities a quantifiable
advantage over national competitors in the form of charitable
contributions, expenditures on local labor, and additional money
circulating in the local economy.50

44

Id.
See Civic Economics, The Andersonville Study of Retail Economics 4
(Oct. 2004) [hereinafter Andersonville Study] (comparing ten local firms to ten
chain stores), available at http://www.newrules.org/retail/news_slug.php?
slugid=269. Andersonville is a Chicago neighborhood that is attracting interest
from national chain retailers. Id. at 2. The Andersonville Development
Corporation and Andersonville Chamber of Commerce commissioned the study
to assess the economic impact a proposed Borders bookstore would have on the
existing downtown businesses. Id.
46
Id. at 2.
47
Id. at 3.
48
Id. at 5.
49
Id.
50
Id. “That means 70 percent more money circulating in the local
economy, which may mean 70 percent more home improvement, 70 percent
more in the collection plate, and 70 percent more in taxable transactions to fund
city services.” Id. See id. at 4-5 (describing how once the economic impact
studies were adjusted for the size of the stores, the local businesses produced
more positive impact than the national chain stores). Additional studies
conducted in other communities support these conclusions.
45
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B. New York City

Geographers, city planners, and residents appreciate and extol
the virtues of New York City’s retail landscape.51 Stretching over
twenty-two square miles, each of Manhattan’s neighborhoods has
distinct architecture, residents, restaurant offerings, and retail
landscapes.52 The city’s retail offerings play a large part in creating
and preserving its culture.53 “The wealth and variety of new shops
in New York enable the media to present shopping as one of the
city’s cultural attractions—an alternative to the suburbanization
and standardization that have engulfed the rest of the country.”54
Manhattan’s first distinct retailing district emerged in the late
eighteenth century with the 1948 opening of New York City’s first
department store, A.T. Stewart’s Marble Palace.55 Originally
51

See Paul Goldberger, The Malling of Manhattan, METROPOLIS MAG.,
Mar. 2001, available at http://www.metropolismag.com/html/content_0301
/nyc.htm (extolling the benefits and advantages to living in Manhattan); New
York City & Company, Shopping (2004) [hereinafter New York City Shopping]
(New York City’s official tourism website touts the city as a “shopper’s
paradise,” claiming that a shopper can find “anything here from every corner of
the globe.”), at http://www.nycvisit.com/shopSearch/index.cfm?pagePkey=
1281.
52
NY.com, at http://www.ny.com/histfacts/statistics.html.
53
SHARON ZUKIN, THE CULTURES OF CITIES 187-88 (1995) [hereinafter
CULTURES OF CITIES]. Zukin devotes an entire chapter of her book to the role
that shopping plays in urban centers and notes that among the many effects retail
shopping has, it is “one of the modern city’s greatest cultural attractions.” Id.
Zukin also writes that central shopping districts and consumption spaces are
places where “identities and communities are formed.” Id. at 190. The author, a
Manhattan resident, also vividly describes her shopping rituals and praises
Manhattan’s shopping opportunities. Id. “The variety of goods, the scale of the
stores, the easy conversations with farmers and shopkeepers: these are things I
love about New York; they make the city’s huge size and fast pace bearable.” Id.
at 5. See also Steven Kurutz, Obsessed!, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2004, §14, at 1
(discussing the grocery store loyalty and the ensuing grocery store “culture” in
Manhattan).
54
POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 27.
55
Mona Domosh, Shaping the Commercial City: Retail Districts in
Nineteenth-Century New York and Boston, 80 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM.
GEOGRAPHY 268, 273-74 (New York’s retailing district first emerged in 1780);
POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 21 (discussing A.T. Stewart’s Marble
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located on the southern tip of Manhattan, the borough’s retail
district eventually moved uptown by 1920, as most of the big
department stores relocated to Midtown to follow their consumer
base.56 Between 1880 and 1920, the “golden age of department
stores,” these retailers became the “new theaters of consumption”
and helped transform shopping into one of New York City’s
principal attractions.57 In contrast to the national chain stores that
presently dominate the marketplace, the city’s department stores
did not offer their goods at discount prices;58 rather, they enticed
customers, mainly women, with desired personal services and
amenities.59 The early department stores influenced Manhattan’s
cultural development and quickly became surrounded by a diverse
array of retailers providing goods other than clothing.60 During the
next century, smaller retailers spread throughout Manhattan,
spurred on by a strong capitalist drive in the marketplace, the
faltering of urban department stores in the 1970s, and a strong
wave of immigration.61 Smaller retailers eventually assumed their
position as a mainstay of Manhattan’s and New York City’s
culture.62
Palace).
56
POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 116 (stating that B. Altman,
Macy’s, Lord & Taylor, and Bonwit Teller eventually settled between Thirtysixth and Forty-fourth Streets); Id. at 21 (stating that Saks Fifth Avenue and
Bonwit Teller eventually relocated even further north).
57
Id. at 20.
58
Id. at 119. Another difference between department stores and big box
discount stores relates to the products they sell. Id. at 140. Starting in the 1960s,
most department stores, with the exception of Sears, eliminated the “hard”
goods from their inventory and began to focus solely on clothing and
sometimes, furniture. Id.
59
Id. (noting that B. Altman wooed middle-class women shoppers with
personal services like hairdressing salons and fur storage and with such
amenities as elegant ladies’ rooms, restaurants, and post offices).
60
Id. at 21 (noting that “[f]rom the 1840s, street corners sprouted butcher
shops, bakeries, and grocery stores, while more expensive shops for luxury
goods clustered in the center”).
61
Id. at 24-25 (describing the rise and fall or department stores, and the
role of immigrant entrepreneurs in reshaping New York City’s retail
composition).
62
POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 9 (comparing Manhattan to
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In 1996, Manhattan greeted its first national discount retailer.63
Kmart moved that year into two locations, one in the East Village
into a building once occupied by the Wanamaker department store,
and a second in Midtown in a building attached to Pennsylvania
Railroad Station.64 Following Kmart’s lead, other large, national
chain stores, including Best Buy, Staples, Office Depot, and
eventually, Home Depot, soon entered the Manhattan retail market.
In September 2004, Home Depot opened a new two-story outpost
in the Flatiron District of Manhattan, prompting one critic to
lament that the borough was becoming homogenized by chain
stores and restaurants.65
II. ZONING LAW
Zoning law is the oldest and most frequently utilized legal
option to control land use development.66 Zoning ordinances
“dictate the types of uses to which land may be put, the density at
which development may happen, the height, size and shape of
buildings, and the mix of commercial, residential, public, and other
Philadelphia and noting that all of Manhattan seems like a “downtown”
shopping district). See id. at 19-20 (describing the factors which contributed to
the strengthening of Manhattan’s retail culture).
63
Amy Tsao, Manhattan—Where Discount Retailers Fear to Tread, BUS.
WK. ONLINE, Jan. 23, 2002, available at http://www.businessweek.com/
bwdaily/dnflash/jan2002/nf20020123_0412.htm (stating that Kmart moved into
its East Village location in 1996).
64
Id; POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 87 (stating that Kmart took
over the old Wanamaker department store). Kmart operates its second
Manhattan location at 250 West 34th Street. Kmart Store Locator, at
https://mykmart.com/storelocator/storelocator/storelocatorindex.jsp (last visited
Nov. 4, 2004).
65
Jacobson, supra note 35, at 30.
66
RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND USE AND SOCIETY: GEOGRAPHY, LAW
AND PUBLIC POLICY 215 (Island Press 1996) (explaining that zoning gained its
popularity in the 1920s). Zoning gained popularity as the nation’s character
shifted from rural to urban and communities needed a regulatory measure to
control land use. Id. Land use zoning is the most widespread technique used to
control land use in every major United States city except for Houston, Texas. Id.
at 216. Zoning is also the broadest available technique since it applies to most
uses of private land as well as public. Id. at 217.
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land uses in each locality.”67 Although it originated in Germany,
zoning has become a “quintessentially American institution” due to
its enthusiastic adoption by the United States beginning in the
seventeenth century.68 Land-use zoning owes much of its
popularity to the fact that it is the broadest available land control
technique.69
A. Zoning and the Federal Government
Zoning gained national recognition and government support in
1922, when the U.S. Department of Commerce published a model
statute called the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA).70
The SZEA empowered and encouraged the legislative bodies of
states to, in turn, empower their municipalities to enact zoning
regulations for a variety of purposes so long as the resulting
regulations were in accordance with a “comprehensive plan.”71 To
provide additional guidance on the meaning of the term
“comprehensive plan,” the Department of Commerce issued a
second model act in 1928, the Standard City Planning Enabling

67

John R. Nolon, Comprehensive Land Use Planning: Learning How and
Where to Grow, 13 PACE L. REV. 351, 351 (1993).
68
PLATT, supra note 66, at 215; ALEXANDER GARVIN, THE AMERICAN
CITY: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T 356 (McGraw-Hill 1996). Boston,
Massachusetts enacted legislation in 1672 that set regulations for building
materials. Id. In 1692 the Province of Massachusetts Bay limited certain
businesses to particular areas. Nolon, supra note 70, at 356. In 1869, an Illinois
developer created deed restrictions for housing placement and decoration. Id.
69
PLATT, supra note 66, at 216-17 (noting that zoning can be applied to “to
virtually any private use of land and many public uses” and is the most
widespread, broadest, and most contentious land use tool). Zoning is considered
contentious because it has endured spates of public support, ambivalence, and
opposition. Id. at 216.
70
Nolon, supra note 67, at 357. See Standard State Zoning Enabling Act of
1926, available at http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnablingAct
1926.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
71
See Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, § 1 (1926) (empowering local
legislative bodies to enact zoning regulations) (last visited Oct. 29, 2004). See
also id. at §3 (providing that “[s]uch regulations shall be made in accordance
with a comprehensive plan”) (last visited Oct. 29, 2004).
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Act (SPEA).72 All fifty states subsequently enacted some version
of the SZEA; to date, forty-seven of these statutes remain in
force.73
In 1926, municipal exercises of zoning power were upheld by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler
Realty Company.74 In that case, the plaintiff landowner challenged
the municipality’s zoning ordinance, arguing that its encroachment
upon his property violated his federal and state constitutional rights
and lowered the value of his land.75 The Court upheld the village’s
zoning ordinance and granted broad constitutional leeway to
municipal zoning attempts nationwide, recognizing that the
nation’s shift towards an urban character required municipal
regulation.76
Village of Euclid established a deferential standard of review
for the zoning decisions of local governments.77 The Court
72

See Nolon, supra note 67, at 359 (discussing the purpose and effects of
the Standard City Planning Enabling Act); Standard City Planning Enabling Act
of 1928, available at http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/CPEnabling
Act1928.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
73
Michael Lewyn, Twenty-First Century Planning and the Constitution, 74
U. COLO. L. REV. 651, 655-56 (citing Am. Planning Ass’n, Growing Smart
Legislative Guidebook: Model Statutes for Planning and the Management of
Change (2002), available at http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/ (last visited
Oct. 29, 2004).
74
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
75
Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384:
The ordinance is assailed on the grounds that it is in derogation of
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution in
that it deprives appellee of liberty and property without due process of
law and denies it the equal protection of the law, and that it offends
against certain provisions of the Constitution of the state of Ohio.
Id.
76
Id. at 388 (upholding the ordinance). The Court recognized that “[u]ntil
recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but, with the great increase
and concentration of population, problems have developed, and constantly are
developing, which require, and will continue to require, additional restrictions in
respect of the use and occupation of private lands in urban communities.” Id. at
386-87.
77
Id. at 388. The majority held that in order to be upheld, zoning
ordinances and regulations “must find their justification in some aspect of the
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explained that local zoning ordinances will be upheld as
constitutional so long as they are not clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, and bear a substantial relation to “public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare.”78 The majority noted that as
communities continue to grow and develop, they would require
“additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of
private lands in urban communities.”79
B. Zoning and Planning Processes in New York City
New York adopted and codified the Standard Zoning Enabling
Act in 1913 and authorized its cities, and later its towns and
villages, to create plans and zone for specific land use so long as
they performed these functions in accordance with a
“comprehensive plan.”80 New York City derives its power to zone
for specific land usage within its borders from this state
legislation.81 Due to the legislation’s emphasis on compliance with
a comprehensive plan, land use planning provides the backdrop for
municipal zoning actions and guides the decisions made jointly by

police power, asserted for the public welfare.” Id. The Court also noted that the
issue of an ordinance’s legitimacy “varies with circumstances and conditions.”
Id. See also Patrick J. Skelley, Defending the Frontier (Again): Rural
Communities, Leap-Frog Development, and Reverse Exclusionary Zoning, 16
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 273, 276-77 (1997) (describing how local governments benefit
from the decision in Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Company).
78
Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395.
79
Id. at 386-87.
80
See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(24)-(25) (McKinney 2004) (The
legislature enacted this legislation in 1913.); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261 (McKinney
2004) (the legislature enacted this legislation in 1932); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7700 (McKinney 2004) (the legislature enacted this statute in 1972). See also
N.Y. TOWN LAW § 263; N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-704; N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW §
20(25) (McKinney 2004). These three provisions use the terms “comprehensive
plan” and “well-considered plan” interchangeably.
81
New York City Department of City Planning, Zoning, History of NYC
Zoning [hereinafter New York City Zoning History], at http://www.nyc.gov/
html/dcp/html/zone/zonehis.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2005). Although New
York City’s 1916 zoning ordinance was the first in the nation, it subsequently
had to tailor itself to state zoning law requirements. Id.
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the New York City Council and Planning Commission.82
Enacted in 1961, the New York City Zoning Resolution
(Resolution) provides the foundation for every city land use
decision.83 The Resolution contains a map of the entire city and
depicts the uses for which pieces of land are zoned. The text of the
Resolution “establishes zoning districts and sets forth the
regulations governing land use and development.”84 Within the
municipal government, the City Planning Commission has the
authority to propose and adopt resolutions that amend the text or
zoning maps of the Resolution; however, the City Council, the
city’s legislative body, retains the exclusive authority to enact or
reject these amendments.85 Further, the New York City Charter
authorizes the City Council to amend or enact regulations on its
own accord, provided that the Council considers the potential
effects of the regulations on surrounding areas and implements the
regulations as part of a comprehensive plan that is drafted by the

82

See New York City Zoning History, supra note 81 (stating that the
Resolution took effect in 1961); NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION, art.
VII, § 75-00, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonetext.html
(last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (describing the joint authority of the City Planning
Commission and City Council). See also Nolon, supra note 67, at 352
(describing how zoning and planning go hand in hand since “[a]s the predicate
for zoning, comprehensive planning is a critical public function”).
83
See NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION, art. I, § 11-111, available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonetext.html (last visited Feb. 14,
2004) (decreeing that all new development on unused land shall be in
accordance with the regulations of the Resolution); Id. at §11-112 (decreeing
that all new development on previously developed land shall be in accordance
with the regulations of the Resolution).
84
New York City Department of City Planning, Zoning, Zoning Text, at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonetext.html (last visited Feb. 14,
2005).
85
The procedure for amendments to the Zoning Resolution is as follows:
“The City Planning Commission shall adopt resolutions to amend the text of this
Resolution or the zoning maps incorporated therein, and the City Council shall
act upon such amendments, in accordance with the provisions of the New York
City Charter.” NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION, art. VII, § 75-00,
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonetext.html (last visited
Feb. 14, 2005).
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City Planning Commission.86
Since the 1961 enactment of its Zoning Resolution, New York
City has relied on the local zoning ordinance to control the pace
and form of development in the metropolis.87 By statute, New
York City may exercise its zoning discretion with respect to
building type, height, and usage, provided that its zoning
regulations are “designed to promote the public health, safety, and
general welfare.”88 New York City’s zoning scheme classifies each
piece of land by its use: manufacturing, commercial, and
residential.89 Development within each of these districts then
depends upon the use, bulk, and parking requirements found within
the Zoning Resolution.90 For instance, any new development on a
86

N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(25) (McKinney 2004). Section 20(25) states
that the city may:
regulate and restrict the location of trades and industries and the
location of buildings, designed for specified uses, and for said purposes
to divide the city into districts and to prescribe for each such district the
trades and industries that shall be excluded or subjected to special
regulation and the uses for which buildings may not be erected or
altered. Such regulations shall be designed to promote the public
health, safety and general welfare and shall be made with reasonable
consideration, among other things, to the character of the district, its
peculiar suitability for particular uses, the conservation of property
values and the direction of building development, in accord with a well
considered plan.
Id. Although New York City’s Department of City Planning oversees the
planning and land-use processes of New York City, the City Planning
Commission is the entity that directly oversees the drafting of amendments to
the City Zoning Resolution and administers the provisions of the existing
resolution. New York City Department of City Planning, Zoning, About Zoning
[hereinafter
About
New
York
City
Zoning],
at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonetod.html (last visited Feb. 14,
2005).
87
Nolon, supra note 67, at 367. For a broad history of New York City
zoning law, see New York City Zoning History, supra note 81.
88
N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20 (McKinney 2004). Generally, section 20 is a
grant of specific powers to New York City government. Sections 24 and 25
specifically relate to the granting of zoning powers given to the city.
89
About New York City Zoning, supra note 86 (stating that the three types
of designation are residential, commercial, and manufacturing).
90
Id. Stating that:
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parcel of land in New York City must comply with the land’s use
as designated by the 1961 Zoning Resolution.91 If a developer
wishes to construct a building that does not comply with the
parcel’s designation, he must challenge the ordinance before the
Board of Standards and Appeals or the City Planning
Commission.92 However, if the development does not conflict with
the zoning map designation, the developer is entitled to proceed
with development “as-of-right” and need only obtain a building
permit before commencing construction.93 The privilege of as-ofEach zoning district regulates permitted uses; the size (bulk) of the
building permitted in relation to the size of the lot; the required open
space for residential uses on the lot or the maximum amount of
building coverage showed on the lot; the number of dwelling units
permitted on the lot; the distance between the building and the street;
the distance between the building and the lot line; the amount of
parking required; and other requirements applicable to specific
residential, commercial, or manufacturing activities, including the size
and placement of signs.
Id.
91

NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION, art. I, ch. 1, §§11-112, available
at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonetext.html (last visited Feb. 14
2005) (stating that all new uses of land can only be used, constructed or
developed in accordance with the Zoning Resolution).
92
See NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION, art. VII, § 72-01, available
at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonetext.html (2004) (granting broad
powers to the Board of Standards and Appeals for review of the resolution). See
also NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION, art. VII, § 74-01, available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonetext.html (last visited Feb. 14,
2005) (granting power to the City Planning Commission to hear applications for
modification of zoning designations). Although dual authority exists, the City
Planning Commission must still follow the provisions of the Zoning Resolution
when making its decisions. Id.
93
About New York City Zoning, supra note 86 (defining “as-of-right
development”). The Department of City Planning stipulates that:
Most development or use of unimproved land need meet only the
provisions of the Zoning Resolution to be granted a building permit as
a matter of right. This means that a developer may build a structure “asof-right” if the Department of Buildings is satisfied that the structure
complies with the provisions of the Zoning Resolution and the Building
Code. No action is required by the City Planning Commission under
such circumstances. The developer simply files plans with the

CODEY MACROED FINAL 2-18-05.DOC

3/7/2005 6:59 PM

MANAGING RETAIL SPRAWL IN MANHATTAN

269

right development eliminates the need for input from the City
Planning Commission.94
C. Zoning as a Tool to Encourage Smart Retail Development
Due to the practical implications of zoning and land use
regulations, “they are perhaps the greatest determinative factor of
whether a project can be constructed at a given site.”95 Since
zoning decisions enjoy great judicial deference, municipalities
frequently invoke zoning for specific purposes, including fighting
unwanted retail development.96 To control retail development, a
municipality must accomplish two things. First, it must create a
comprehensive plan that announces its goal of regulating future
development.97 Next, it must enact zoning ordinances that
implement the plan.98 According to Village of Euclid, after
complying with the above steps, the city can defend its zoning
decisions on the grounds that the ordinance was not clearly
Department of Buildings and can begin construction upon issuance of a
building permit.
Id.
94

Id.
MICHAEL E. CUSACK & JOHN P. STOCKLI, JR., ZONING AND LAND USE 3
(New York State Bar Association 2003).
96
See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial
deference exhibited towards zoning decisions); Nolon, supra note 67, at 353
(noting that since localities are responsible for zoning, they can zone in order to
accomplish their own specific objectives); NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING
RESOLUTION art. I available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/
zonetext.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (The preamble to the city’s zoning
resolution states that “[t]his Resolution is adopted in order to promote and
protect public health, safety and general welfare.”). See also Forte v. Borough of
Tenafly, 255 A.2d 804 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969) (considering that the
purpose of the town’s zoning decision was to restrict commercial development
to specific property as a means of revitalizing the town’s central business
district, the court upheld the zoning decision even after Plaintiff purchased land
intending to build a supermarket, and the town subsequently rezoned the land
for non-commercial use).
97
See Nolon, supra note 67, at 352 (arguing that since a town’s plan can be
whatever the town wants it to be, zoning is equally malleable).
98
Id.
95
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arbitrary or unreasonable and that it was a valid exercise of the
municipality’s police power.99
Municipalities and states have taken different approaches in
their attempts to use zoning law as a tool to guard against future
“big box” development in their communities. For example, city
zoning ordinances may place caps on the square footage of an
allowed development, set forth stringent rules regarding parking
lots on a given site, or even require the completion of economic
impact studies that relate to proposed development.100 Although
these efforts have met with sporadic success, large national
retailers have adapted themselves to meet these efforts, even
reducing the size of their stores by 1,000 square feet so as to avoid
the 100,000 square feet cap imposed by some municipalities.101
III. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
In recognition of the potential impact of land use development
projects on the environment, Congress enacted the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969.102 NEPA sought to
99

Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395. See supra Part II.A.
See Sprawl-Busters, Victories (2004), at http://www.sprawlbusters.com/victoryz.html. This portion of the Sprawl-Busters website contains
links articles documenting successful efforts of communities to block big box
retailers. Id. In Kansas, one municipality adopted a multi-faceted ordinance that
stipulated detailed caps on square footage as well as regulations concerning the
parking lot’s size and appearance. Sprawl-Busters, Planners OK Innovative Cap
on Floor Size (Oct. 8, 2004), at http://www.sprawl-busters.com/search.
php?readstory=1502. In Los Angeles, the City Council issued a preliminary
approval vote of a zoning ordinance which would require economic impact
studies of any store over 100,000 square feet. Sprawl-Busters, City Council
Takes First Vote on Big Box Impact Ordinance (Aug. 10, 2004), at
http://www.sprawl-busters.com/search.php?readstory=1499.
101
Anita French, Smaller Supercenters in Wal-Mart’s Future, MORNING
NEWS, Nov. 11, 2004, available at http://www.nwaonline.net/articles/
2004/11/04/wal_-_mart/77wmurban.txt. Wal-Mart calls their 99,000 square foot
model the “Urban 99” prototype. Id. Although the company insists that the
model was developed to fit better into urban areas, an industry analyst believes
that the decision was due in part to zoning ordinances blocking stores of more
than 100,000 square feet in size. Id.
102
42 U.S.C. § 4331 (Supp. V. 1964). The statute states:
100
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encourage the federal government and its agencies to engage in
environmentally-sound decision making.103 In relevant part, NEPA
requires that the policies, regulations, and laws of the nation be
interpreted and administered in conjunction with the federal
policies outlined in the statute.104 Specifically, NEPA requires that
all federal agencies consider the environmental ramifications of
their actions through the adoption of an interdisciplinary approach
to decision making and the submission of detailed reports on the
potential environmental effects of any proposed action.105
[I]t is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation
with State and local governments, and other concerned public and
private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures,
including financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to
foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of
present and future generations of Americans.
Id. § 4331(a).
103
Todd Gregory Monahan, Seeking the Spirit of SEQRA From Beneath the
Paperwork, 65 ALB. L. REV. 539, 542 (2001) (discussing how NEPA the
commitment of the federal government towards preservation and consideration
of the environment).
104
42 U.S.C. § 4332.
105
Id. The statute directs all federal agencies to:
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure
the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the
environmental design arts in planning and in decision making which
may have an impact on man’s environment; (B) identify and develop
methods and procedures, in consultation with the Council on
Environmental Quality established by subchapter II of this chapter,
which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities
and values may be given appropriate consideration in decision making
along with economic and technical considerations; (C) include in every
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on—(i)
the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse
environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the
relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v)
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Many states followed in Congress’s footsteps and enacted their
own environmental review statutes.106 These state statutes vary in
scope and form, but most share NEPA’s goal of injecting
environmental considerations into each land use decision made at
the government level.107 The state of Vermont, for example,
enacted a statute that allows the state to consider the potential
economic impacts of proposed development under the rubric of
environmental review.108 New York has a purely environmental
review statute that seeks to achieve similar objectives.109 State
environmental review statutes have frequently been invoked for the
purpose of monitoring, controlling, and mitigating the
environmental effects of industrialization and development.110 The
success of efforts to curb development often rests on the
interpretation of these statutes by state courts, especially with
regard to the meaning of the term “environment.”111 This section
explores the intersection of federal, state, and city environmental
law and the applicability of these statutes to challenges brought
any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Id.
106

As of 2004, fifteen states and the District of Columbia had their own
NEPA-type environment impact review statute. David Sive & Mark A. Chertok,
“Little NEPAs” And Their Environmental Impact Assessment Processes, SJ101
ALI-ABA 1013, 1015 (2004).
107
See 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (Supp. V 1964) (NEPA encourages agencies to
incorporate environmental review into their decision-making processes); N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 2004). New York’s
state counterpart to NEPA encourages environmentally aware policy making. Id.
108
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6092 (2004). See also infra Section
IIIB for a discussion of Act 250 and cases litigating its provisions.
109
See infra note 161.
110
See James Murphy, Vermont’s Act 250 and the Problem of Sprawl, 9
ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 205 (2004) (The author notes that sprawl and
related development can have impacts on the environment such as: an increase
in air pollution due to increased automobile traffic; destruction of the physical
environment; worsened water quality due to runoff; and effects upon
groundwater).
111
See e.g. Chinese Staff and Workers Ass’n v. City of New York, 68
N.Y.2d 359 (1986) (construing the term “environment” broadly, benefiting antidevelopment advocates).
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against development by large national retailers.
A. Intersection of New York State and New York City
Environmental Law
Building on the foundation laid by NEPA, New York enacted
the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) in 1976.112
In enacting SEQRA, the state legislature sought to establish a
consistent statewide policy of incorporating environmental
consequences and public participation into the decision-making
processes of governmental agencies.113 The legislature also sought
to promote efforts that promised to “prevent or eliminate damage
to the environment and enhance human and community
resources.”114 SEQRA’s prescriptions are more demanding than
those of NEPA, given that the statute requires not only procedural
compliance but also substantive compliance.115 The statute
112

N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 2004). In
relevant part, SEQRA provides that:
Agencies shall use all practicable means to realize the policies and
goals set forth in this article, and shall act and choose alternatives
which, consistent with social, economic and other essential
considerations, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize or avoid
adverse environmental effects, including effects revealed in the
environmental impact statement process.
Id. § 8-0109(1).
113
Monahan, supra note 103, at 543 (describing how SEQRA shares
similar policy goals with NEPA). See Philip Weinberg, SEQRA: Effective
Weapon—If Used As Directed, 65 ALB. L. REV. 315 (2001) [hereinafter
Effective Weapon] (noting that SEQRA has “furnished an absolutely vital
fulcrum from which the public can participate in—and if necessary challenge—
decisions inflicting environmental impacts on local communities”).
114
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0101.
115
See Monahan, supra note 103, at 544 (NEPA stipulates that once an
agency has procedurally complied with the statute’s requirements, a court may
not interject within the decision-making process. However, SEQRA requires not
only “environmentally sound decision-making,” but also “the creation of
environmentally sound policy”) (emphasis added); Kathryn C. Plunkett,
Comment, Local Environmental Impact Review: Integrating Land Use and
Environmental Planning Through Local Environmental Impact Reviews, 20
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 211, 216 (2002) (“SEQRA goes beyond NEPA and
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mandates that state and city agencies and legislative bodies
conduct environmental analyses before undertaking any project or
activity, or engaging in policy, regulation, or procedure making.116
New York City has adopted SEQRA and extended the
application of the statute to its own agencies through the City
Environmental Quality Review (CEQR).117 SEQRA and CEQR
require that agencies act to “minimize or avoid adverse
environmental effects,” and require the preparation of an
environmental impact statement (EIS) when an initial review
process reveals that a project “may have a significant effect on the
environment.”118 An EIS is a detailed statement that must contain a
description of the proposed project, the project’s environmental
impacts, any adverse environmental effects posed by the
development, alternatives to the proposed action, and an evaluation
of additional considerations listed within SEQRA.119
Given that the SEQRA review process centers on the
evaluation of environmental impacts posed by development
projects, judicial interpretation of the word “environment” is
critical.120 SEQRA defines “environment” as “the physical
conditions which will be affected by a proposed action, including
land, air, water, minerals, flora, fauna, noise, objects of historic or
aesthetic significance, existing patterns of population
concentration, distribution, or growth, and existing community or
neighborhood character.”121
In Chinese Staff & Workers Ass’n v. City of New York,122 the
plaintiff association challenged the sufficiency of the state’s
imposes substantive requirements on agencies.”).
116
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105(4) (defining agency “action”).
117
See City of New York Exec. Order No. 91, CEQR (Aug. 24, 1977) and
the current CEQR rules, Rules of the City of New York tit. 62, ch. 5 (1991).
118
See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(1); Id. § 8-0109(2) (setting
forth situations that require the preparation of an environmental impact
statement).
119
Id. § 8-0109(2)(a)-(j).
120
See Chinese Staff and Workers Ass’n v. City of New York, 68 N.Y.2d
359 (1986).
121
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 8-0105 (6).
122
68 N.Y.2d 359 (1986).
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environmental review model and argued that the City Planning
Department’s limited interpretation of the term “environment” was
contrary to the meaning and purpose of SEQRA and CEQR.123
Specifically, the plaintiff association contested the construction of
a high-rise building on an empty lot in Chinatown.124 In order to
comply with SEQRA regulations, the project’s developers had
previously submitted an application for a special permit to the
city’s Department of City Planning and its Department of
Environmental
Protection.125
After
reviewing
relevant
environmental considerations, the agencies granted the
development permit without requiring the preparation of a draft
EIS.126 The plaintiff association challenged the approval of the
permit and argued that the city agencies’ environmental review
was “arbitrary and capricious because of the failure of the lead
agencies to consider whether the introduction of luxury housing
into the Chinatown community would accelerate the displacement
of local low-income residents and businesses or alter the character
of the community.”127
The New York Court of Appeals agreed that a permit should
not have been granted without further review.128 The court held
that when deciding whether to require the preparation of an EIS, a
lead agency must consider all possible environmental effects,
whether physical, social, or economic, in order to comply with
SEQRA.129 The Court of Appeals noted that although a project
might be small in physical scope, it still might have a large impact
on the surrounding community.130 Under the interpretation set
forth in Chinese Staff, SEQRA and CEQR require agencies to
123

Id. at 365. The City Planning Department argued that since the effects
argued by the plaintiffs are not ones that “impinge upon the physical
environment in a significant manner,” they are outside the scope of the word
“environment” as used in SEQRA. Id.
124
Id. at 362.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 363.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 366.
130
Id. at 367.

CODEY MACROED FINAL 2-18-05.DOC

276

3/7/2005 6:59 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

inspect the possibility that a proposed project will cause the longterm displacement of residents and businesses in determining
whether the project will have a significant effect on the
environment.131
B. Environmental Law as a Tool For Smart Retail
Development
The broad reach of SEQRA and other environmental review
statutes permits environmental advocates to challenge proposed
development projects based on their anticipated negative
consequences for the environment.132 Although SEQRA permits
consideration of community or neighborhood character within its
environmental analysis, New York courts have stopped short of
expressly allowing agencies to consider a project’s potential
impact on competition.133 The ability to force agency evaluation of
a project’s impact on competition is a boon to anti-“big box retail”

131

Id. at 368. The court determined that its holding was:
limited to a determination that existing patterns of population
concentration, distribution or growth and existing community or
neighborhood character are physical conditions such that the
regulations adopted by the City of New York pursuant to SEQRA
require an agency to consider the potential long-term secondary
displacement of residents and businesses in determining whether a
proposed project may have a significant effect on the environment.
Id.
132

See Monahan, supra note 103, at 540-41 (Since SEQRA requires
adverse environmental impacts to be assessed earlier on in the process than
NEPA, SEQRA has the potential “to be a powerful action-forcing environmental
law in New York.”).
133
See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 8-0105(6); Chinese Staff, 68 N.Y.2d at
366 (allowing for consideration of neighborhood and community character);
East Coast Development Co. v. Kay, 667 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996). In
this case, the court determined that the economic effects of a proposed store on
the existing downtown retailers could not be the sole support for the city
planning board’s SEQRA-based decision. Id. at 184. Although the court
ultimately determined that there was additional support for the board’s
determination, it warned localities not to couch economics-based development
decisions in the language of SEQRA. Id. at 184-85.
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advocates.134 The state of Vermont, placed on the National Trust
for Historic Preservation’s “endangered list” due to rampant retail
development, recognized this opportunity and adopted an
aggressive statutory stance against unwanted retail development
within its borders.135 The state enacted the first version of Act
250136 in 1970, creating a growth-management statute that
prioritizes community participation in land-use planning decisions,
with a particular emphasis on concerns about the environment,
including the small business sector.137 The statute provides for
joint local and state involvement in the permitting process.138 A
developer seeking an Act 250 development permit must first apply
to the appropriate district commission.139 The commission then
holds evidentiary hearings in which all interested parties, including
private citizens, may participate.140 The board considers testimony
and evidence from the hearing as well as the criteria set forth in
Act 250 in determining whether to grant the development
134

When the environmental review process allows parties to present
evidence that proposed development would have a negative economic impact on
the community it benefits small business owners. See infra notes 139-151 and
accompanying text.
135
See NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, AMERICA’S 11
MOST
ENDANGERED
HISTORIC
PLACES
(2004)
available
at
http://www.nationaltrust.org/11most/2004/index.html (placing the entire state of
Vermont on this list for the second time since 1990 due to the “invasion” of
Wal-Marts into the state).
136
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6092 (2004).
137
Weiss, supra note 10, at 33. Vermont’s Act 250 seeks to involve
individuals in the land-use planning process through local meetings and
evidentiary hearings, creating a shift in the power dynamic of planning. Id. at
33-34. In Vermont, the land-use planning process requires attention paid and
priority given to the environmental impacts of proposed projects. Id. at 42. See
Sherry Keymer Dreisewerd, Staving Off the Pillage of the Village: Does In Re
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Offer Hope to Small Merchants Struggling for Economic
Survival Against Box Retailers? 54 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 323, 325
(1998) (noting the extensive capabilities of Act 250 to slow or stop
development).
138
Id. at 330 (describing how Act 250 is unique because it provides for
concurrent control by both state and local governments).
139
Id. at 332.
140
Murphy, supra note 110 (describing the Act 250 review process).
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permit.141
In 1997, the Vermont Supreme Court unanimously upheld a
decision by the state Environmental Board that denied a state land
use permit request by Wal-Mart, Inc.142 In In re Wal-Mart, WalMart sought to build a store two miles from the historic town
center of St. Albans, Vermont.143 Based on its findings that WalMart’s entrance into the St. Albans community would negatively
affect the town’s tax base and its smaller downtown retailers, the
Environmental Board denied Wal-Mart’s permit application.144
The Vermont Supreme Court upheld the decision.145 The
Environmental Board and the Vermont Supreme Court concluded
that a project’s potential effects on market competition can justify
the denial of a development permit within the scope of an
environmental impact analysis.146
Environmental review statutes are an important factor in the
realm of retail development, both for opponents and developers.147
141

Id.
See In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 167 Vt. 75 (1997).
143
Dreisewerd, supra note 137, at 336.
144
In re Wal-Mart Stores, 167 Vt. at 78 (noting that this case is an appeal
from a previous denial of a permit by the Environmental Board).
145
Id. at 87. See Dreisewerd, supra note 137, at 338 (stating that the
Environmental Board decided that the extent to which a proposed development
might have a substantial adverse economic impact on existing businesses is a
relevant criteria under Act 250); Roper & Humstone, supra note 2, at 762. WalMart argued that Act 250 was only concerned with physical and environmental
impact, but the Supreme Court found that Criteria 9(A) and 9(H) explicitly
require consideration of economic impacts of development. Id. Criterion 9(A)
requires consideration of the community’s financial ability to absorb new
development. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(a)(9)(A). Criterion 9(H) requires
consideration of the costs to the community of the development, including
balancing increase to tax base with costs of employment and education. VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(a)(9)(H).
146
In re Wal-Mart Stores, 167 Vt. at 82 (determining that the
Environmental Board properly considered the financial ability and capacity of a
town to absorb a development project as a valid consideration under Act 250).
147
See Chinese Staff and Workers Ass’n v. City of New York, 68 N.Y.2d
359 (1986). This case is a good example of anti-development advocate use of
SEQRA to block development. Id.; Adam L. Wekstein & Geraldine N.
Tortorella, Navigating the Land Use and Zoning Minefield, 466 PRAC. L. INST.
142
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SEQRA’s consideration of the impact of development projects on
neighborhood character and Act 250’s emphasis on environmental
considerations open the door for future challenges by residents and
small business owners who seek to slow or halt the expansion of
large national retailers.148
IV. ANTITRUST LAW
Antitrust law exists as an annex to the traditional areas of law
used to challenge retail development. The goal of federal antitrust
law is to protect competition.149 Despite this seemingly simple
goal, federal antitrust law targets a variety of corporate behavior.150
At the federal level, three principal antitrust statutes operate to
protect competition: the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and Federal
Trade Commission Act (FTC Act).151 Each of these statutes has a
different purpose and plays a different role in federal antitrust
litigation.
In 1890, facing a new wave of corporate consolidation in the
railroad industry and a variety of corporate combinations,
19 (warning attorneys who practice in land use about the varied ways
environmental review statutes impact the practice of land use law).
148
See Chinese Staff, 68 N.Y.2d at 359 (solidifying the validity of
considering a proposed action’s impact on neighborhood and community
character under SEQRA); In re Wal-Mart, 167 Vt. at 81 (recognizing that the
financial impacts of a retailer’s entrance into the local economy is a valid
consideration under Act 250).
149
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND THE CONSUMER
(2004) [hereinafter ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND THE CONSUMER], at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/div_stats/9142.htm (stating that “antitrust laws
protect competition”).
150
Id. The Sherman Act “outlaws all contracts, combinations and
conspiracies that unreasonably restrain interstate and foreign trade,” specifically
ones that suppress competition with “anticompetitive conduct.” Id. The Clayton
Act prohibits “mergers or acquisitions that are likely to lessen competition.” Id.
The Federal Trade Commission Act “prohibits unfair methods of competition in
interstate commerce.” Id.
151
See William H. Borghesani, Jr. et al, Food for Thought: The Emergence
of Power Buyers and Its Challenge to Competition Analysis, 4 STAN. J.L. BUS.
& FIN. 39, 69 (1999) (noting and naming the three main federal antitrust
statutes).

CODEY MACROED FINAL 2-18-05.DOC

280

3/7/2005 6:59 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act.152 The Sherman Act
prohibits “every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign
nations.”153 In an attempt to further protect competition during the
economic surge that preceded the Great Depression, Congress
amended the Sherman Act in 1914 to include the Clayton Act.154
The Clayton Act’s provisions authorize the government to review
and regulate mergers and other transactions that may lessen
competition or “tend to create a monopoly.”155 Congress passed the
third major statute, the FTC Act, in 1914.156 With a broader reach
than the other statutes, the FTC Act prohibits “unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce.”157
Although not part of the trilogy, a fourth antitrust statute
operates specifically to protect small businesses.158 In 1936,
Congress adopted the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA) as a
modification of the existing Clayton Act. 159 The RPA reflects
congressional concern that the influx and spread of chain stores
across the United States would destroy competition because small
152

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). See Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC:
Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 6
(2003) (stating that Congress was motivated by the environment of trusts in
business when drafting the Sherman Act); George J. Stigler, The Origin of the
Sherman Act, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN ACT 32 (E.
Thomas Sullivan ed., 1991) (noting that interest in a federal anti-monopoly act
arose in the wake of complaints regarding raising railroad rates and “flourishing
industrial trusts”).
153
15 U.S.C. § 1.
154
15 U.S.C. §§ 12-14, 19, 21, 22 and 27 (2004).
155
15 U.S.C. § 18. Additional provisions of the Clayton Act govern a
variety of vertical restrictions that may serve to harm competition. See 15
U.S.C.A. § 14; ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND THE CONSUMER., supra note 149
(noting that the Clayton Act also “prohibits other business practices that under
certain circumstances may harm competition).
156
15 U.S.C. §§ 42-58 (2004).
157
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
158
See David J. Kates, Recouping the Losses of Brooke Group, 73 WASH.
U. L.Q. 609, 613 (1995) (noting that the RPA “was designed principally to
afford market protection to small businesses”).
159
15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (West 2004).

CODEY MACROED FINAL 2-18-05.DOC

3/7/2005 6:59 PM

MANAGING RETAIL SPRAWL IN MANHATTAN

281

businesses would be unable to compete with the lower prices of
chain stores.160 The RPA makes it unlawful for “any person
engaged in commerce . . . to sell, or contract to sell, goods at
unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition
or eliminating a competitor.”161 The RPA prohibition against price
discrimination thus provides small businesses with a legal means
of challenging the practices of large national retailers.162
A. Federal Antitrust Litigation
Following the enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936,
plaintiffs were able to successfully challenge predatory pricing
structures under the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts.163 In
1967, the U.S. Supreme Court heard and decided one such
challenge in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.164 Based in
Salt Lake City, Utah Pie Company brought suit against Continental
Baking Company and other similarly-situated baking companies
for violations under the Sherman Act and section 2(a) of the
Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.165 Utah Pie
160

See Kates, supra note 158, at 613.
15 U.S.C. § 13a (2004).
162
See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967)
(challenging primary line price discrimination under the RPA); Lepage’s Inc. v.
3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 2003) (finding for a plaintiff medium-size office
supplies manufacturer who alleged predatory pricing in the form of loyalty
rebates issued by 3M to retailers).
163
See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
164
386 U.S. 685 (1967).
165
Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 687. Plaintiffs also charged a conspiracy among
the defendants under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. The relevant language
from §2(a) of the Clayton Act provides:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate
in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and
quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such
discrimination are in commerce . . . where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them.
161
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alleged that the defendants had sold frozen pies in the “Salt Lake
Market at prices lower than it sold pies of like grade and quality in
other markets considerably closer to its plants” in an effort to
destroy competition from the Utah Pie Company in violation of the
RPA’s ban on price discrimination.166 Overturning the lower court,
the Supreme Court accepted the plaintiffs’ arguments and gave
broad reach to the language of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman
Acts.167 The Court concluded that the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals had incorrectly decided that the anti-competitive evidence
proffered by Utah Pie Company was insufficient to present to a
jury.168 The Court also rejected the defendants’ proffered cost
justification defense.169 The Supreme Court held that the language
of predatory intent found in Continental Baking Company
memoranda outweighed the company’s defense of cost
justification and established evidence sufficient to present to a
jury.170
In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court decided its first predatory
pricing case since Utah Pie and exhibited new skepticism toward
plaintiffs alleging the existence of below-cost pricing schemes.171
In Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco,172 the plaintiff
cigarette manufacturer alleged that the defendant manufacturer’s
competitive pricing strategies were designed to suppress the
plaintiff’s prices and thus violated section 13(a) of the Robinson15 U.S.C. §13(a).
166
386 U.S. at 690.
167
Id. at 703. (“We believe that the Act reaches price discrimination that
erodes competition as much as it does price discrimination that is intended to
have immediate destructive impact.”).
168
Id. at 704.
169
Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 697-702 (writing in note 14 of its opinion, the
Supreme Court rejected the defendants’ argument that Utah Pie’s dominance
within the market justified their drastic price cuts).
170
Id. at 696-97.
171
See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209 (1993); Donald J. Boudreaux et al., The Supreme Court’s Predation
Odyssey: From Fruit Pies to Cigarettes, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 57 (1995)
(noting that the Brooke Group decision demonstrates the court’s “heightened
skepticism towards claims of predatory pricing”).
172
509 U.S. 209.
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Patman Act.173 The Supreme Court found for the defendant
manufacturer and implemented a higher evidentiary standard for
future predatory pricing plaintiffs.174 The majority established a
two-part test for price discrimination that requires plaintiffs to set
forth evidence of below-cost pricing as well as the probability that
the competitor will be able to recoup its losses.175 The Court stated
that “[r]ecoupment is the ultimate object of an unlawful predatory
pricing scheme; it is the means by which a predator profits from
predation.”176 Justice Stevens argued in his dissent, however, that
the majority’s pro-consumer rationale was misguided.177 He
asserted that although price cutting is a competitive practice that
lowers prices and saves money for consumers, the practice
destroys competition and harms consumers once prices fall below
the retailer’s cost.178

173

Id. at 216 (The plaintiff alleged “illegal price discrimination between
Brown & Williamson’s full-priced branded cigarettes and its low-priced
generics.”).
174
See Kates, supra note 158, at 628-29; Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 230-31
(admitting that the plaintiff’s theory of defendant’s liability is within the reach
of the statute, but depends too much upon a “complex chain of cause and effect”
to constitute a violation of the statute). In order to succeed, a plaintiff must show
1) that the defendant set prices below some measure of cost and 2) that the
defendant has a “reasonable prospect” or “dangerous probability” of recouping
his losses. Id. at 223-24. The second element that must be proved by a plaintiff
changes depending upon whether the suit is brought under the Sherman or
Robinson-Patman Act. The standard under the Robinson-Patman Act is a
“reasonable prospect” and the standard under the Sherman Act is a “dangerous
probability.” Id. at 224.
175
509 U.S. at 222-27 (discussing the two prerequisites for recovery for a
price discrimination plaintiff). First, a plaintiff must prove that his rival’s
challenged prices are below “an appropriate measure of its rival’s costs.” Id. at
222. Next, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the rival had a “reasonable
prospect” of “recouping its investment in below-cost prices.” Id. at 224. The
court emphasized the important of proving recoupment since without it,
consumer welfare would be improved since prices had been lowered. Id. at 224.
176
Id. at 224.
177
Id. at 256 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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B. State Antitrust Litigation as a Tool to Protect Small
Businesses

Small businesses have had greater success as antitrust plaintiffs
in suits brought under state unfair business practices statutes.179
Although a state statute cannot preempt federal legislation, it can
supplement it.180 As a result, states may proscribe a broader array
of behavior and make it easier for plaintiffs to prove violations.181
Many antitrust statutes are modeled after and contain language
nearly identical to the Clayton and Sherman Acts.182 Unlike federal
legislation, however, these statutes often include a specific,
179

See American Booksellers Assn., Inc. v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 135
F.Supp.2d 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that “secret” discounts received by
defendants are actionable under California Unfair Trade Practices Act); Star
Fuel Marts v. Murphy Oil USA, No. Civ.-02-202-F, 2003 WL 742191 (W.D.
Okla. Jan. 29, 2003) (holding that below-cost pricing by defendant gas station
was actionable under Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act).
180
Wal-Mart Stores v. American Drugs, 319 Ark. 214, 233-34 (1995)
(Niblock, J., dissenting) (citing to the preemption test established by Capital
Cities Cable v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984)). The dissent notes that Capital Cities
Cable Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984), established the controlling test for
determining whether federal legislation preempts a state statute. Id. The Court in
Capital Cities evaluated the existence of preemption based on four factors:
[w]hether Congress expressed a clear intent to preempt state law;
whether Congress occupies the field so as to leave no room for the
states to supplement; whether compliance with both the state and
federal laws is impossible; and whether the state law stands as an
obstacle to Congress’ objective or purpose.
Wal-Mart Stores, 319 Ark. at 233 (citing Capital Cities, 467 U.S. 691).
181
Wal-Mart Stores, 319 Ark. at 233. The preemption test in Capital Cities
Cable v. Crisp allows state statutes to co-exist with federal legislation so long as
Congress did not express an intent to preempt state law, the federal legislation
leaves no room for the state statute to exist, compliance with both state and
federal law is possible, and the state law does not stand as an obstacle to
Congress’ objective or purpose. Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699
(1984).
182
See James R. McCall, Private Enforcement of Predatory Price Laws
Under the California Unlawful Practices Act and the Federal Antitrust Acts, 28
PAC. L.J. 311 (1997) (comparing the California UPA and counterpart federal
legislation and noting that the language of the two are very similar, but the
California statute has a broader scope).
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plaintiff-friendly definition of “cost” and proscribe a wide range of
predatory pricing behavior.183
As noted by legal scholars, a statute’s definition of “cost” or
the court’s interpretation of the same concept often determines the
fate of an antitrust plaintiff.184 In federal antitrust litigation, before
a plaintiff can proceed, he must first prove that the defendant
priced its products below cost.185 Thus, although cost can be a
difficult and expensive concept for a plaintiff to determine, it is
essential to below-cost pricing litigation.186 Federal law and the
U.S. Supreme Court, however, have been silent with respect to the
definition of “cost.”187 In practice, the two most common methods
used to determine a defendant’s costs are “average variable cost”
(AVC) and “average total cost” (ATC).188 Designed by two law
professors, the AVC standard does not account for the fixed costs
of the seller and instead divides the total avoidable costs by the
number of units produced.189 In this case, a price above AVC
183

See id. (stating that the California statute’s definition of “cost” makes it
easier for plaintiffs to prevail and that the California statute has a broader
scope).
184
See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223 (failing to create a definitive
standard for determining “cost”); Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing:
Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2253 (2000) (noting that
plaintiff’s success rate in predatory pricing cases in the era preceding the Brooke
Group decision depended on what calculation of “cost” a court used). Typically,
to an economist, “cost” actually represents the concept of “total costs”,
“meaning all costs incurred to produce the item including labor, materials,
overhead, or any other type of cost.” McCall, supra note 182, at 316.
185
Brooke Group, 209 U.S. at 222.
186
See Bolton, supra note 184, at 2271 (arguing that even though cost is a
complicated concept, since 1975 courts have “followed a cost standard in
evaluating predatory pricing”).
187
See id. at 2255 (noting that the Brooke Group Court did not adopt a
specific definition of “cost” for its predatory pricing test).
188
See McCall, supra note 182 at 317-24 for a complete discussion of the
different cost concepts.
189
Id. at 318. Professors Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner believe that
since a seller cannot avoid the fixed costs of production, these should not be
included in a calculation of his costs. Id. (citing Phillip Areeda & Donald F.
Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 700 (1975)). “Fixed costs are those that do
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would be presumptively nonpredatory and one below AVC would
be presumptively predatory.190 The ATC standard, by contrast,
divides the total of all costs by the number of units produced.191 By
including the fixed costs that the AVC standard omits, the ATC
method yields a higher number, making it easier for a plaintiff to
point to a product’s price and show that it is “below cost.”
State antitrust legislation often proves advantageous to
plaintiffs, given that it provides a specific definition of cost to
assist courts in determining whether defendants are engaged in
below-cost pricing.192 For example, the California Unlawful
Practices Act (UPA) and Unfair Competition Act (UCA), and the
Arkansas Unfair Practices Act define cost using the average total
cost standard.193 By defining cost as average total cost, these
statutes account for even the manufacturer’s fixed costs.194 The
ATC standard for calculating costs results in a higher value than
the AVC standard and thus makes it easier for predatory pricing
plaintiffs to prove that a manufacturer priced items below cost.195
In addition to including specific, plaintiff-friendly definitions
of cost, state statutes may also proscribe a broader array of
corporate behavior.196 Two comprehensive examples of state
antitrust legislation are the Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act and the
not vary with output and typically include management expenses, depreciation,
property costs, and other irreducible outlays.” Bolton, supra note 184, at 316.
190
Bolton, supra note 184, at 318.
191
Id. at 316.
192
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101 (West 2004); CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17210 (West 2004); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-201 – 217
(b)(1) (Michie 2004).
193
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17026 (West 2004); CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 17029 (West 2004) (defining manufacturing costs); ARK. CODE ANN. §
4-75-209(b)(1).
194
See supra note 189 for a discussion of fixed costs and their impact on
predatory pricing situations.
195
See Bolton, supra note 184, at 316 (by defining a company’s
manufacturing costs expansively, statutes like California’s make it easier for
plaintiffs to prove a violation by below-cost pricing).
196
For instance, the Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act and the California UPA
both prohibit the use of “loss leaders,” a practice that is not prohibited by federal
antitrust law. See infra notes 197-202.
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California UPA and UCA.197 Unlike their federal counterparts, the
Oklahoma and California statutes have broad provisions
prohibiting the use of “loss leaders” in competition and, in turn,
create a more favorable legal environment for small business
plaintiffs.198 Each statute provides a similar, specific definition of
“loss leader.” The California statute defines “loss leader” as:
any article or product sold at less than cost: (a) Where the
purpose is to induce, promote, or encourage the purchase of
other merchandise; or (b) Where the effect is a tendency or
capacity to mislead or deceive purchasers or prospective
purchasers; or (c) Where the effect is to divert trade from or
otherwise injure competition.199
Loss leader provisions target retailers who lure customers into
their stores with below-cost prices, destroy favorable competition,
and prey on the gullibility of consumers.200 These provisions rest
on the premise that a customer who visits a store because of
advertised loss leader prices will expect all other items in the store
to be similarly priced, although they often are not.201 Thus, loss
leader pricing projects an overall image to the public that a store
contains bargain-priced merchandise, harming smaller competitors
who are unable to mimic below-cost pricing.202
197

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 598.1-598.11 (West 2004); CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101 (West 2004); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 1720017210 (West 2004).
198
See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 598.3 (prohibiting use of loss leaders);
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17044 (prohibiting use of loss leaders). These
statutes contrast with the Sherman and Clayton Acts, which do not include loss
leader pricing as a proscribed business practice. See Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger
Co., 402 F.2d 968 (8th Cir. 1968). In Hiland, the District Court found that the
plaintiff’s assertion that defendant used loss leader selling tactics was
insufficient to assert a successful claim under the Sherman Act. Id. The court
determined that the purpose of the Sherman Act was to prevent monopolization
and that loss leader tactics rarely lead to monopolization in a field. Id. at 975.
199
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17030.
200
Safeway Stores Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass’n, 360 U.S. 334,
340 (1959).
201
Id. at 340.
202
Star Fuel Marts v. Murphy Oil USA, No. Civ.-02-202-F, 2003 WL
742191 at *7-*8 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 29, 2003) (noting that a gap in advertised
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Plaintiffs have experienced mixed success challenging large
national retailers under state unfair practices statutes. In 1995, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas decided Wal-Mart Stores v. American
Drugs and determined that plaintiffs challenging below-cost sales
by Wal-Mart did not make their case under the Arkansas Unfair
Practices Act.203 The Arkansas UPA requires a plaintiff to show
that below-cost sales were made “for the purpose of injuring
competitors and destroying competition.”204 The Arkansas
Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs did not present
sufficient evidence from which the court could infer this intent.205
Since the Arkansas statute does not prohibit loss leaders, WalMart’s strategy of selling alternating items below cost for varied
periods of time does not violate the statute absent evidence of
intent to injure or destroy competition.206
In 2003, a federal district court in Oklahoma issued an
injunction in Star Fuel Marts v. Murphy Oil USA to enjoin Sam’s
Club gasoline stations from selling fuel at prices below cost in
violation of the Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act.207 The evidence
presented by the plaintiff service stations showed that, for eight
months, the Sam’s Club gas stations in question had operated at a
prices between competitors leaves consumers with the image that the higherpriced competitor is “gouging”).
203
Wal-Mart Stores v. American Drugs, 319 Ark. 214, 216 (1995). The two
plaintiffs, owners of small pharmacies, alleged that Wal-Mart “was selling
individual items below cost for the purpose of injuring competitors and
destroying competition in violation of § 4-75-209(a)(1) of the Act.” Id. at 216.
204
ARK. STAT. § 4-75-209(a)(1).
205
Wal-Mart Stores, 319 Ark. at 220 (noting that “the individual items sold
below cost, the frequency of those sales, the duration of those sales, and the
extent of such sales are not revealed in the chancery court’s opinion”).
206
Id. at 221. The court determined that the circumstantial evidence
presented was not enough to establish a violation of the Act in the absence of
some legislative action to outlaw the use of loss leaders. Id. at 224-25. It is
notable that in the wake of this decision, the Arkansas legislature did not take
any steps to outlaw the use of loss leaders. ARK. STAT. § 4-75-209.
207
Star Fuel Marts, 2003 WL 742191, at *15 (granting entry of a
preliminary injunction). The federal district court had jurisdiction over this case
because the Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act allows a plaintiff to bring a suit in any
court of “equitable jurisdiction.” OKLA. STAT. tit. 15 § 598.5(a). Sam’s Club is a
subsidiary of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Star Fuel Marts, 2003 WL 742191, at *1.

CODEY MACROED FINAL 2-18-05.DOC

3/7/2005 6:59 PM

MANAGING RETAIL SPRAWL IN MANHATTAN

289

significant loss.208 Although the Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act
requires evidence of a defendant’s intent to injure competition, in
contrast to the Arkansas Unfair Practices Act, the Oklahoma
statute allows a plaintiff to introduce evidence of below-cost sales
as “prima facie evidence of intent to injure competitors and to
destroy or substantially lessen competition.”209 The below-cost
pricing constituted prima facie evidence for the plaintiffs, and the
defendants’ internal management manual discussing the objectives
of their plan completed the inference.210 The court concluded that
the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to support the
granting of a preliminary injunction prohibiting Sam’s Club gas
stations from selling gasoline below cost.211
C. New York’s Statute
New York enacted its current antitrust statute in 1909.212 The
Donnelly Antitrust Act created a private right of action for any
party injured by actions that restrain trade or create monopolistic
market conditions.213 The Donnelly Act stipulates that:
[e]very contract, agreement, arrangement or combination
whereby . . . [c]ompetition or the free exercise of any
activity in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce
or in the furnishing of any service in this state is or may be
restrained or whereby [f]or the purpose of establishing or
maintaining any such monopoly . . . is hereby declared to
be against public policy, illegal and void.214
New York’s attorneys general have invoked the Donnelly Act
in a variety of situations. For example, the state prevailed in
litigation against a dominant software corporation for alleged
208

Star Fuel Marts, 2003 WL 742191, at *5 (over eight months, the
stations in question operated at a loss of $250,000).
209
OKLA. STAT. tit. 15 § 598.5(c). See Star Fuel Marts, 2003 WL 742191,
at *10 (discussing this statutory provision).
210
Id. at *12.
211
Id. at *15.
212
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 340-347 (McKinney 2004).
213
Id. § 340.
214
Id.
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monopolization215 as well as against two hospitals for
inappropriate merger activity within the healthcare industry.216
However, the Donnelly Act does not include any provisions similar
to those embodied by section 2 of the Sherman Act or the
Robinson-Patman Act. Although New York State’s antitrust
enforcement department is considered among the most active in
the country, the department is limited in practical focus and
concentrates primarily on monopolistic behavior rather than price
discrimination or below-cost pricing schemes.217
Beginning in 1964, the New York Attorney General’s Office
began to garner positive attention for its antitrust prosecutions.218
During the last forty years, the New York Attorney General has
been involved in a variety of cases brought under the Donnelly Act
and, at times, jointly under state and federal legislation.219 These
215

See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
Even though the case was tried in District Court in Washington, D.C., New
York was a named plaintiff in the suit and alleged violations of New York
antitrust statutes. Id.
216
See New York v. St. Francis Hosp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(involving allegations that two hospitals were participating in what the court
termed a “virtual merger” in violation of the Sherman Act). For an in-depth look
at New York antitrust activity and litigation, see Harry First, Delivering
Remedies: The Role of the States in Antitrust Enforcement, 69 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1004, 1019-25 (2001). The Attorney General of the New York State and
private citizens and businesses share the power to enforce antitrust statutes.
OFFICE OF NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL ELIOT SPITZER, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT IN NEW YORK (2004), at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
business/antitrust.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2005). The Office of the Attorney
General possesses the power to investigate and prosecute violations of both state
and federal antitrust law. Id.
217
See First, supra note 216, at 1016 (describing the prosecutions of the
New York antitrust bureau).
218
See Philip Weinberg, Office of N.Y. Attorney General Sets Pace for
Others Nationwide, 76- JUN. N.Y. ST. B.J. 10, 11 (2004) (noting that “[b]y 1964,
the National Association of Attorneys General was to note that New York was
the most active state in the antitrust field”); First, supra note 216, at 1016
(describing how New York is “generally considered to have one of the more
active state antitrust enforcement agencies”).
219
See Edward D. Cavanagh, New York Antitrust Bureau Pursues Mandate
to Represent State Interests in Fostering Competitive Environment, 72-JAN.
N.Y. ST. B.J. 38, 38 (2000). Antitrust actions are often brought jointly under the
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prosecutions have focused primarily on investigations of horizontal
monopolistic behavior and merger activity.220 There has been a
notable dearth of predatory pricing prosecution, given that the
Donnelly Act does not include any language prohibiting belowcost pricing and that New York’s state and federal courts have
generally construed the provisions of the Act in light of federal
antitrust precedent.221 In cases that involve interpretations of the
Donnelly Act in light of federal jurisprudence, the New York
Court of Appeals has placed the burden of persuasion “on the one
who contends that federal decisional law should not be
followed.”222 For small business antitrust plaintiffs in New York,
this signals a Brooke Group-type fate unless the state statute is
amended.
V. EVALUATING NEW YORK CITY’S LEGAL REMEDIES FOR BIG BOX
DEVELOPMENT
The arrival of The Home Depot in the Flatiron District and in
Midtown marks the dawn of a new retail culture in Manhattan.223
While this scenario has been documented extensively in the
context of suburban and rural areas, it has largely been ignored on
Donnelly Act and federal antitrust statutes because the state law is not as
comprehensive or developed as the federal law. Id.
220
Cavanagh, supra note 219, at 38 (noting that New York antitrust
enforcement “focuses principally on horizontal restraints and mergers”).
However, the author also notes that in the past twenty years, “the Antitrust
Bureau has been far more willing than federal authorities to prosecute cases
involving vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance, supplier-imposed
customer and territorial restraints and tying.” Id.
221
Burton C. Agata, An Overview of Substantive Law Under the Donnelly
Act, in ANTITRUST LAW IN NEW YORK STATE 47, 57 (Robert L. Hubbard &
Pamela Jones Harbour eds., 2002) (“Although federal court decisions construing
the Sherman Act cannot bind state court construction of the Donnelly Act, state
and federal court decisions have emphasized the extent to which Sherman Act
cases and doctrines have been adopted by the New York State courts in
construing and applying the Donnelly Act.”).
222
Id. at 57 (citing People v. Rattenni, 81 N.Y.2d 166 (1993)).
223
See POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 6 (noting how New York
City has changed, with bigger stores opening all the time).
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the urban scale.224 Although many cities envy Manhattan’s ability
to attract retail development in the age of suburbanization and an
automobile-centric shopping culture, city and state administrators
should proceed with caution.225
Manhattan has always been a great place—a place where
people love to work, live, and visit.226 With a larger variety of
stores and activities than suburbs, city neighborhoods allow
residents to form a special sense of place and attachment.227 Urban
residents have the opportunity to browse around the city and
encounter people, items, and experiences that are culturally
strange, engaging in a “socially heterogeneous” experience.228 As
the city becomes increasingly suburbanized, however, its
consumption spaces will become more standardized and
homogeneous, and the city will increasingly lose its sense of
224

Boswell & McGrath, supra note 24 (describing how large retailers have
generally stayed away from urban markets because of high cost of land). See
Karen Bellantoni, Big-Box Retailers Target Manhattan, REAL EST. WKLY., Jan.
28, 2004, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3601/
is_24_50/ai_113140928 (describing how big box retailers had previously
avoided Manhattan due to a scarcity of retail space, the lack of large parking
lots, prohibitive retail rents, and the “high cost of labor, real estate taxes and
utilities”).
225
See Sakowicz, supra note 1, at 387 (noting that sprawl-type
development usually occurs outside of city centers because it is less expensive).
226
See Deborah C. Roth, Wish You Were Here: A Cross-Cultural Analysis
of Architectural Preservation, Reconstruction, and the Contemporary Built
Environment, 30 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 395, 418-19 (2003). There is a
difference between “space” and “place.” Id. Space is “indifferent and has no
memory attached to it.” Id. (citing Barry Curtis, That Place Where: Some
Thoughts on Memory and the City, in THE UNKNOWN CITY: CONTESTING
ARCHITECTURE AND SOCIAL SPACE 55 (Iain Borden et al., eds., 2001). But place
is a “by-product of our subjective relationship to a space via memory and
association.” Id.
227
Jeremy R. Meredith, Sprawl and the New Urbanist Solution, 89 VA. L.
REV. 447, 461 (2003) (citing Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1048-49 (1996)).
228
Sharon Zukin, Urban Lifestyles: Diversity and Standardization in
Spaces of Consumption, 35 URB. STUDIES, May 1998, at 825. Zukin also
describes her fascination with the variety of experiences that Manhattan’s shops
and stores offer. POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 9.
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place.229 Manhattan’s landscape of consumption, while still
diverse, has homogenized over time, prompting one newspaper
writer to warn that the city is turning into “Anywhere, USA.”230
Faced with a shortage of suitable space, logistical problems
such as traffic and supply concerns, and high real estate and
operating costs, “big box” retailers traditionally have shied away
from Manhattan.231 Until the early 1990s, Manhattan’s lack of
large discount retailers was unique as compared to the rest of the
nation.232 However, when one looks at the citywide dispersion of
Staples and Office Depot and the recent opening of Home Depot,
the trend suggests that Manhattan has begun to move toward the
national norm.233 If Home Depot experiences financial success in
Manhattan and the city government remains receptive to further
“big box” development, other retailers may follow in Home
229

Gordon MacLeod et al., Negotiating the Contemporary City:
Introduction, 40 URB. STUDIES, Aug. 2003, at 1655.
230
Zukin, supra note 228 (writing that the diversity is “often submerged by
the increasing standardization of consumption spaces”); Mark Jacobson, supra
note 35, at 30 (lamenting the influx of national retailers and restaurants into
Manhattan and wondering whether Manhattan is turning into “Anywhere,
USA”). Not every Manhattan resident is sorry to see big box retailers move into
their neighborhoods. See Rita Kramer, New York’s Missing Megastores, 6 CITY
J. (1996), available at http://www.city-journal.org/html/ 6_4_new_yorks_
missing.html (noting that New York has become a “retail backwater” and that
the city “sends its own residents elsewhere to do their shopping”). Kramer
describes the retailing boom of nearby suburbs and laments that Manhattan
residents used to be forced to leave the city to shop at stores like Wal-Mart,
Kmart and Home Depot. Id. Kramer believes that big stores bestow benefits on
the surrounding community and that “if big retailers are allowed to flourish,
small businesses don’t die; they adapt and take advantage of the wider market.”
Id.
231
See POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 66 (discussing the high price
of land, difficulty of making deliveries, and zoning laws as barriers to entry);
Boswell & McGrath, supra note 24 (citing Manhattan residents’ intense
“NIMBYism” as an additional concern for the big box retailers. “NIMBY”
stands for “Not In My Backyard” and describes the cultural phenomenon of
grass-roots resistance to development with potentially negative local
consequences).
232
POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 65.
233
Tsao, supra note 63 (stating that Kmart moved into its East Village
location in 1996).
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Depot’s footsteps and change the city inalterably.234 Although
these retailers continue to woo city officials with promises of job
creation and revenue for the city, New York City anti-“big box”
advocates have several options for combating this wave of retail
development.235
Traditionally, community advocates have grounded their
challenges to this type of retail development in three principal
areas of the law—zoning, environmental, and antitrust law.236 This
section will address each of these alternatives, discuss the
attributes and drawbacks of each, and ultimately recommend
which option is best suited to fighting unwanted retail development
in Manhattan.
A. Shortfalls of Zoning Law
Although zoning ordinances provide a means of monitoring
and controlling development at the grassroots level and enjoy great
deference from New York courts, New York’s state zoning law is
of limited effectiveness in confronting the challenges of sprawl.
The participants in the zoning process, the process itself, the state
statutory language and New York City’s use of as-of-right
development permitting have combined to limit the ability of
zoning to curb retail growth.
The ability of zoning regulations to address local needs is
notably thwarted by the member structure of New York City’s
Planning Commission and the attendant rules that govern the
zoning process.237 Because zoning cannot be justified unless it fits
234

See Bellantoni, supra note 224. Bellantoni believes that Manhattan will
likely see more big box development as other major retailers enter the market,
especially if the delivery service for large and bulky products proves successful.
Id. Target is eyeing a space as large as 200,000 square feet, Kohl’s is looking for
120,000 square feet and Costco is mulling 150,000 square feet. Id. Home Depot
may be only the beginning.
235
See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (describing the promises big
box retailers make concerning jobs and revenue).
236
See Part II.C; III.B; and IV.B (discussing the zoning, environmental,
and antitrust law options respectively).
237
See Nolon, supra 67, at 351-52 (“Zoning is a key method by which
society encourages the development of jobs and housing, protects natural
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into a comprehensive plan, zoning ordinances fall within the
authority of the New York City Planning Commission.238 The
Planning Commission is comprised of thirteen members of the
public.239 The Mayor appoints seven members, each of the five
Borough Presidents appoints one, and the Public Advocate
appoints the last.240 Since commission members are not publicly
elected and are subject to little oversight, the ordinances that
emerge from the planning process may reflect the specific interests
of members rather than the general welfare of the community.241
resources and the environment, and defines the character of its communities.”).
But see Amy Widman, Replacing Politics with Democracy: A Proposal for
Community Planning in New York City and Beyond, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 135, 149
(2002) (arguing that New York City’s planning process “suffers from a lack of
inclusive public participation”).
238
See CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK CITY CHARTER § 197-c. This
section creates and describes the “Uniform Land Use Review Procedure.” Id.
Under this section, the Commission reviews applications submitted that fall
within several categories stated in § 197-c (a) and either certify the application
or recommend that it be revised. Id. §197-c (c).
239
New York City Department of City Planning, About Us - Commission
Information (2004), at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/about/plancom.html.
240
Id. The five boroughs of New York City are Brooklyn, Manhattan,
Staten Island, Queens, and the Bronx. The Public Advocate is an elected official
who serves as a go-between for City residents and their government. Public
Advocate for the City of New York, About the Public Advocate, at
http://www.pubadvocate.nyc.gov/about.shtml.
241
Platt, supra note 66, at 251. See Widman, supra note 237, at 150
(advocating for greater public participation in the New York City planning
process and asserting that the city planning process “suffers from an overall lack
of emphasis on inclusive public participation”); Nolon, supra note 67, at 360
(noting that since “a planning board is comprised of appointed, rather than
elected, members, the pressure of the electorate is felt less in its deliberations”);
Tom Angotti, “As-of-Right” Development: An Invitation to Ethical Breaches?,
GothamGazette.com (2003), at http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/landuse/
20030619/12/430. In this article, the author highlights the shortfalls of the
zoning process in New York City. Id. Additionally, the author speaks to
allegations of impropriety within the City Planning Department. Id. During
discussions regarding a proposed Home Depot store in Brooklyn, a former city
planner alleges that “[w]hile participating in meetings with the project
developers, their attorneys, and City Planning staff, [she] witnessed [her] own
staff utilize the zoning code to assist the developers in designing an as-of-right
project in order to avoid community engagement.” Id.
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Zoning in the state of New York generally has “evolved into a
flexible, if unpredictable, method of land use regulation.”242
Although the language of the state’s zoning requirements appears
specific, state courts have given broad construction to the statute’s
words.243 Thus, the judicial climate that surrounds zoning-related
litigation is decidedly deferential to cities and their zoning
boards.244 As a result, New York City has met with little difficulty
in crafting zoning ordinances that meet the standard of New York
state judicial review.245 So long as a zoning ordinance is drafted
with a larger, comprehensive plan in mind, it will be upheld in
state court.246 Indeed, zoning ordinances enjoy such great judicial
deference that it is difficult to successfully challenge development
decisions that occur in accordance with city and state zoning
prescriptions.247 This can result in development that complies with
zoning regulations, but does not necessarily benefit members of the
community.
Advocates also criticize zoning as a “piecemeal” approach to
land use.248 Once land is zoned for a specific use and an investor
purchases that land for development consistent with the designated
242

Nolon, supra note 67, at 370.
See id. at 371-73 for a discussion of the various ways courts have
interpreted the meaning of New York state zoning regulations.
244
See Dur-Bar Realty Co. v. City of Utica, 57 A.D.2d 51 (4th Dep’t.
1977); Town of Bedford v. Vill. of Mount Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178 (1973)
(standing for the proposition that as long as a town has zoned in accordance with
a “comprehensive plan,” the ordinance will be upheld). Additionally, it is
important to note that when a plaintiff challenges an existing zoning ordinance,
he carriers the heavy burden of proving non-conformance with a comprehensive
plan. See Nolon, supra note 67, at 402-3.
245
See supra note 86 for text of the N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW §20(25) requiring
land use decisions to be in accordance with a “well considered plan.” Id.
246
See Nolon, supra note 67, at 393 (noting how “compliance with a
comprehensive plan will save even the most burdensome land regulations” from
being invalidated).
247
See Part II.A (discussing the judicial deference exhibited towards zoning
decisions made in accordance with a plan).
248
See Shoemaker, supra note 6, at 904 (noting that opposition to
Vermont’s Act 250, a zoning and land use statute, focuses on the statute’s
reactionary stance and piecemeal solutions).
243
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use, it is difficult for a zoning board to block the proposed
development project.249 In New York City, land is frequently
designated for “as-of-right development,” which permits
development without any review by the Planning Commission.250
To commence construction on a project, a developer in this
situation need only secure a building permit.251 This lot-by-lot
approach, including the granting of automatic development rights,
fails to properly account for the impact of development projects on
the surrounding community.252 What appears sufficient on a
building permit application may mask potential economic impacts
on area retailers.253 As a result, as-of-right development “often
frustrates efforts by communities to influence the design of new
projects in a way that makes them compatible with existing
development and the community’s visions for the future of the
neighborhood.”254
B. Shortfalls of Environmental Approach
In tandem with zoning challenges, community advocates also
may employ environmental law to combat the adverse effects of
249

This is termed “as-of-right development.” For a discussion, see supra
note 121 and accompanying text.
250
See New York City Department of City Planning, Zoning, About
Zoning – Terms and Procedures, at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/
zonetod.html (defining “as-of-right development”) (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
251
Id.
252
See Angotti, supra note 241 (noting the drawbacks to as-of-right
development).
253
Id.
254
Id. The author points to the 2003 resignation of a professional planner
assigned to the Brooklyn Office of City Planning as evidence that the as-of-right
development process raises ethical concerns. Id. The planner alleged that the
planning staff “ ‘utilize[d] the zoning code to assist the developers in designing
an as-of-right project in order to avoid community engagement.’” Id. Angotti
asserts that as-of-right zoning leaves too many decisions to be made behind
closed doors. Id. For additional concern about close ties between city
administrative officials and private developers see Charles V. Bagli, For City
Official and Developer, Close Ties Mean Close Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2004, at A1 (describing the problems inherent when former business executives
move into the public sector and are in a position to exhibit favoritism).
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proposed development projects. New York’s environmental review
statute, SEQRA, seeks to incorporate environmental consequences
into the decision-making processes of government bodies.255
Acting in tandem, SEQRA and CEQR require that state and city
agencies conduct environmental analyses before undertaking any
project, activity, or policy-making exercise.256 Despite favorable
SEQRA precedent in New York, however, environmental law is a
limited vehicle for anti-development litigation against future Home
Depots or Wal-Marts.257
The SEQRA and CEQR notably emphasize compliance with
the review procedures they outline.258 This focus on procedural
rather than substantive compliance has caused environmentalists to
claim that SEQRA has lost its “environmentalist spirit”259 and that
its processes have become too time consuming and expensive, and
have compelled permit applicants to evade or circumvent the
statute.260 Further eroding the force of the statute, some courts have
become satisfied with mere procedural compliance with SEQRA
and have come to overlook consideration of whether the statute’s
substantive goals have been realized.261
255

Monahan, supra note 103, at 543 (describing goals of SEQRA).
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105(4) (describing which agency
actions trigger environmental analysis).
257
See Chinese Staff and Workers Ass’n v. City of New York, 68 N.Y.2d
359, 368 (1986). This case serves as favorable precedent for those wishing to
challenge big box retail development since it allows the impact on community
character and businesses to be included in the term “environment.” Id.
258
See Effective Weapon, supra note 113, at 316 (describing how courts
became sticklers for making sure that applicants followed SEQRA procedures).
259
See generally Monahan, supra note 103, at 542. Environmentalists
criticize SEQRA’s emphasis that applicants meet procedural requirements,
arguing that the legislation has lost sight of what it is meant to achieve. Id.
260
Id. at 575 (describing how SEQRA falls short because it does not
account for the economic or temporal realities of the EIS process). Applicants
know that they potentially will be subjected to a time-consuming, expensive,
and unwieldy process and thus try to evade the process when possible. Id. at
574-75. See e.g., Citizens Against Retail Sprawl ex rel. Ciancio v. Giza, 280
A.D.2d 234, 238 (2001). SEQRA requires agencies to meet all procedural
statutory requirements. This is a time-consuming endeavor and may dissuade
agencies from undertaking SEQRA review. Id.
261
Monahan, supra note 103, at 541-42. See Effective Weapon, supra note
256
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Critics also note a weakness in SEQRA’s reliance on a “lead
agency” to conduct and oversee the environmental review.262 As
one commentator writes, “the designation of the lead agency is
vital to whether genuine SEQRA compliance will occur” since
some agencies may be more willing to shrug off their
responsibilities than others.263 By handing over so much
responsibility to one agency, SEQRA fails to ensure that each
project’s environmental issues receive equal depth of review.
New York’s existing statutes are insufficient to combat the
influx of “big box” retailers within the city’s borders.264 If
developers are able to circumvent environmental conservation
legislation, then there is little to stop city agencies from granting
building permits and approving zoning changes. Although an
environmental approach allows challengers to a project to come
forward before development, obstacles such as extreme judicial
deference and confusion over which governmental body will
become the lead agency still exist and act as barriers to fully
unlocking the “conservationist potential” of SEQRA.265
C. Shortfalls of Antitrust Law
Despite the applicability of the Sherman, Clayton, and
Robinson-Patman Acts to the prosecution of predatory pricing
113, at 316 (discussing the disadvantage to emphasizing procedural
compliance). As long as agencies follow the procedures of SEQRA, “courts are
reluctant to interfere with the actual determinations governments make.” Id.
262
See Effective Weapon, supra note 113, at 321-22.
263
Id. at 321.
264
See In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 702 A.2d 397 (Vt. 1997) (discussing
Vermont’s SEQRA-like Statute “Act 250,” which allows zoning boards to give
significant weight to financial and economic effects of proposed development).
Wal-Mart argued that the state environmental board should not have considered
Wal-Mart’s impact on the surrounding retail market. Id. The Vermont Supreme
Court disagreed. Id. It is important to note that along with SEQRA, NEPA has
its critics as well, with many urging that the statute has lost its teeth. See Bradley
C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333 (2004) (evaluating
ways that NEPA falls short and advocating solutions to make it stronger).
265
Monahan, supra note 103, at 576. See Effective Weapon, supra note
113, at 316-18.
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schemes used by national chain stores, courts and federal agencies
have not been receptive to these challenges since the 1960s.266 This
era of federal suspicion has not helped New York small business
plaintiffs who strive to remain in business a mile from a Wal-Mart
or Target store. Although some states have expressly provided
small business owners with statutory protection from large
competitors who engage in below-cost pricing, New York has yet
to embrace this approach.267 The combination of federal skepticism
toward predatory pricing plaintiffs and insufficient state protection
renders New York City’s small business owners vulnerable in the
face of “big box” development.
Economists have noted a shift from the “populist era of
predatory pricing enforcement”268 during the Great Depression to
the current antitrust prosecution strategy, which is markedly less
aggressive and favors larger companies and lower prices for
consumers.269 In Brooke Group, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth a
266

See Bolton, supra note 184, at 2250 (noting that during the early years
of the RPA, enforcement of federal antitrust statutes protected small firms from
price-cutting by large sellers). See also Boudreaux, supra note 171, at 57
(stating that since Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967)
there had not been a predatory pricing case until Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993)).
267
For a successful state regime, see supra notes 207-211 (discussing
successful state unfair practices litigation for below-cost sales in Oklahoma).
See infra Part IV.C. for a discussion of how New York’s current antitrust statute
is insufficient for the small business plaintiff.
268
Bolton, supra note 184, at 2250.
269
See Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust at the Turn of the 21st Century: A View
From the Middle, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 583, 586 (2002) (“Antitrust in the
United States is now primarily, though not exclusively, designed to protect the
welfare of consumers.”); See also David Close, “Don’t Fear the Reaper”: Why
Transferable Assets and Avoidable Costs Should Not Resurrect Predatory
Pricing, 88 IOWA L. REV. 433, 435 (2003) (explaining that the Supreme Court
decision in Brooke Group has hobbled plaintiffs seeking to bring suits under
federal antitrust legislation since); See also McCall, supra note 182, at 315. The
Warren Court from 1953 to 1969 expansively interpreted federal antitrust
legislation in favor of plaintiffs. This era ended in 1980. Id. Federal agencies
have had a difficult time determining when to prosecute and when to let market
forces take their course. Close, supra, at 440; Pitofsky, supra, at 584-85
(describing the evolution of federal antitrust enforcement over different

CODEY MACROED FINAL 2-18-05.DOC

3/7/2005 6:59 PM

MANAGING RETAIL SPRAWL IN MANHATTAN

301

higher evidentiary standard for predatory pricing cases and
required the plaintiffs to make an extensive two-part showing to
prove the existence of price discrimination under section 13(a) of
the Robinson-Patman Act.270 Unfortunately, the philosophy behind
the Brooke Group decision lives on. Since the Brooke Group
decision, private plaintiffs have had limited success in court
because of “(1) exacting proof and pleading requirements, spurred
by the Supreme Court’s open invitation to dismiss predatory
pricing cases by summary means; (2) skepticism that predation can
ever be a plausible business strategy; [and] . . . (3) judicial neglect
of modern strategic theories of predatory pricing.”271 However,
many economists support the Brooke Group decision and argue
that courts should take a hands-off approach to regulating market
conditions at the risk of extinguishing competitive pricing
altogether.272 Under this rationale, predatory pricing is considered
“a successful and fully rational business strategy.”273 This view,
however, fails to acknowledge the dangers of predatory pricing
once competitors are able to force rivals from the marketplace.274
By compelling a rival’s exit from the market or precluding a
retailer’s entrance into the market, a predatory retailer can raise
prices and reduce innovation and product variety without
consequence.275
Despite evidence that predatory pricing may be used as an
presidential administrations).
270
Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 509 U.S. 209, 222-27
(1993).
271
Bolton, supra note 184, at 2259. See also Peterson, supra note 2, at 352
(“The Supreme Court’s ruling in Brooke Group may have signaled the eventual
demise of predatory pricing claims.”).
272
Boudreaux, supra note 171, at 58-59.
273
Bolton, supra note 184, at 2241.
274
See id. at 2242.
275
See id. at 2243 (stating that “the anticompetitive effects of predatory
pricing are higher prices and reduced output—including reduced innovation”);
Roy Beth Kelley, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. American Drugs, Inc.; Drawing the
Line Between Predatory and Competitive Pricing, 50 ARK. L. REV. 103, 125
(1997) (conceding that although loss leader pricing can be good for consumers
because it brings lower prices, a retailer can engage in this practice and then
raise prices and eventually harm consumers).
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instrument of economic abuse, some argue that courts and
economists have failed to sufficiently recognize the dangers of
below-cost pricing or protect small business entrepreneurs from
predatory tactics of larger competitors.276 The federal concept of
predatory pricing balances the anti-competitive harm of an action
against its pro-competitive impact in order to determine whether
the action violates a federal statute.277 Courts and agencies,
however, have faced difficulties in interpreting federal antitrust
law in a manner that preserves a fair balance between competitors,
competition, and consumers.278 Courts often engage in only a brief
analysis of pricing practices, and enforcement agencies feel
pressure from economists to support pro-big business policies that
enhance market efficiency.279 These forces combine to create an
uncertain environment for small-business antitrust plaintiffs.280
276

Bolton, supra note 184, at 2241.
Borghesani, supra note 151, at 76 (noting that this concept is termed
“rule of reason” analysis).
278
See Close, supra note 269, at 440 (stating that judges and policy makers
are plagued by the desire to strike a balance between the interest in prohibiting
anticompetitive predatory practices and preserving low prices); Pitofsky, supra
note 269, at 586, 588 (asserting that predatory pricing usually benefits
consumers because the practice lowers prices).
279
See Borghesani, supra note 269, at 81. When a court sees that consumer
prices have dropped because of the actions the plaintiff complains of, the
analysis usually stops there, but fails to account for long-term market effects. Id.
If lower prices drive competitors from the market, consumers will be later
harmed by a narrowed variety of goods and retailers who sell them. Id. Also,
agencies face pressure from economists who fear forsaking efficiency in the
name of predatory pricing prosecution. See Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355,
1358 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that “[a] firm that cuts its prices is not necessarily
engaging in predatory pricing. It may simply be responding to new competition,
or to a downturn in market demand”); Bolton, supra note 184, at 2241 (noting
that the consensus view in modern economics is that predatory pricing “can be a
successful and fully rational business strategy”); Boudreaux, supra note 171, at
63. Since investigation into and prosecution of potential predatory pricing
schemes costs time and money, economists feel that the determination should be
left to market forces for the sake of efficiency. Id.
280
The Supreme Court has taken a favorable position towards big business,
state legislatures have enacted antitrust statutes that range in coverage, and
policymakers are split on the effectiveness of antitrust legislation. See Kelley,
supra note 275, at 121 (discussing opposing economic theories). See also
277
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The greatest obstacle facing New York antitrust plaintiffs
remains the absence of a state unfair business statute comparable to
those of California or Oklahoma.281 To achieve an even playing
field with retailers of all sizes, New York’s business community
deserves a broad-reaching state antitrust statute that protects
competition and competitors.282 These two objectives are not
mutually exclusive, despite the Brooke Group court’s assertion that
antitrust law is intended to protect competition not competitors.283
In fact, frequently “individual competitors must be protected in the
interest of preserving competition.”284 A New York statute that
prohibits loss leader selling and predatory pricing would serve the
interests of New York’s market and simultaneously protect its
participants.
VI. NEW YORK CITY’S BEST BET: RE-DRAFT THE STATE
ANTITRUST STATUTE
As unique enterprises, small retail and service-oriented stores
have both economic and cultural importance to New York City’s
economy.285 Although the bright signs and billboards of retail
behemoths often overshadow the contributions of the city’s small
businesses, “a vibrant small business sector, despite its ills and

Peterson, supra note 2, at 354 (commenting that judges have become suspicious
of antitrust plaintiffs’ ulterior motives).
281
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 598.1-598.11 (West 2004); CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101 (West 2004); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 1720017210 (West 2004).
282
See Louis B. Schwartz, “Justice” and Other Non-Economic Goals of
Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076, 1076-77 (1979) (stating that goals of justice
and antitrust laws sometimes demand protection of competitors as well as
competition).
283
See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 220 (emphasizing that by its terms, the
RPA only outlaws price discrimination when it threatens to injure competition,
not when it might injure competitors).
284
Schwartz, supra note 282, at 1077.
285
Blake D. Morant, The Quest for Bargains in an Age of Contractual
Formalism: Strategic Initiatives for Small Businesses, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING
BUS. L. 233, 240-41 (2003).
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pitfalls, becomes a key determinant of a healthy economy.”286 In
order to enhance New York City’s financial vibrancy, the city’s
small business sector should be preserved and encouraged to grow.
To best accomplish this goal, the New York state legislature
should re-draft New York’s existing antitrust statute to better suit
the interests of small retailers and consumers.
A. Proposed Expansion of New York’s Antitrust Statute
Despite economists’ concerns regarding the feasibility of state
involvement in antitrust litigation,287 state antitrust statutes have
assumed a unique role within antitrust litigation.288 However,
difficulties with jurisdictional issues, questions of allowable
damages, and enforcement complications between states and
federal agencies have dissuaded states from passing their own
prominent antitrust legislation.289 This trend is distressing, given
that state-level antitrust legislation is critical to the welfare of both
consumers and small businesses.290 Unlike federal antitrust
litigation, “most state antitrust enforcement focuses on cases with
particular localized impact on consumers, whether they are brought
by a single state alone or on a multistate basis.”291 The protection
of New York City’s consumers and small retailers requires strong
state-level antitrust legislation and enforcement. Although New
York has antitrust legislation on the books, it presently lacks the
strength to adequately protect what makes New York City

286

Id. at 244.
Prominent judicial commentator and economist Richard Posner has
called for states to cease involvement in antitrust litigation and has
recommended that states repeal their antitrust legislation. See Richard A. Posner,
Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 940-42 (2001).
288
State antitrust prosecution differs from federal prosecution because the
state statutes are broader in their proscriptions and employ a specific definition
of “cost.” See supra Part I.V.B.
289
First, supra note 216, at 1033-40.
290
See id. at 1019 (state antitrust legislation is better able to address local
concerns than federal).
291
Id.
287
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unique.292
The New York Antitrust Bureau states that the goal of New
York antitrust legislation is to “ensure that industry is competitive,
with a number of manufacturers or distributors of a product or
service, all striving to attract customers.”293 Although New York’s
antitrust legislation aims to protect both competition and
consumers, the statute is not strong enough to enable the Bureau to
fully accomplish its goals of protecting and ensuring a free market
economy.294 The Donnelly Act’s failure to prohibit loss leaders
effectively handcuffs the Antitrust Bureau and prevents the agency
from sufficiently protecting the interests of New York’s small
businesses from encroaching “big box” retailers.295
The New York State legislature should follow the lead of
California and Oklahoma in entering the sphere of localized,
aggressive antitrust enforcement.296 Through state antitrust
enforcement, states may distance themselves from federal antitrust
policies and adopt a more lenient threshold for plaintiffs.297 So
long as a state statute does not preempt federal law, its scope may
be broader than that of federal legislation.298
New York may want to model its new antitrust legislation on
292

California, Florida, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Texas are considered to
have expansive antitrust legislation. First, supra note 216, at 1016. First also
recognizes that despite other states having stronger legislation than New York,
there are still many states that have passed weaker antitrust legislation than that
of New York. Id.
293
Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Antitrust
Enforcement in New York (2004), at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/business/
antitrust.html.
294
See id. (stating that the antitrust laws are “aimed at protecting
consumers’ purchasing power and saving jobs and businesses, all at the same
time”).
295
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 340-347 (McKinney 2004).
296
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 598.1-598.11 (West 2004); CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101 (West 2004); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 1720017210 (West 2004).
297
See First, supra note 216, at 1037 (describing how, for better or worse,
the paths of state and federal litigation often diverge); Peterson, supra note 2, at
358 (states may make it easier for plaintiffs to demonstrate predatory intent).
298
See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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the unfair practices legislation of California, which is even more
comprehensive than the Oklahoma statute.299 The state’s two major
antitrust statutes, the Unlawful Practices Act (UPA)300 and the
Unfair Competition Act (UCA),301 aim to protect both consumers
and businesses.302 California’s statutory antitrust prohibitions
enjoy the broadest possible application.303 The statutes proscribe a
wider range of activities than the federal statutes and employ a
specific, plaintiff-friendly definition of “cost.”304 For the purpose
of determining whether a seller is pricing below cost, the
California UPA employs the seller’s “average total cost” (ATC).305
By including all possible business expenses of the seller in the
calculation, the average total cost for a product increases. The UPA
thus makes it easier for a plaintiff to prove that a seller sold goods
below cost.306
California offers a second advantage to plaintiffs bringing suit
under the California UPA for predatory, below-cost pricing.
Section 17071 of the UPA stipulates that proof of a below-cost sale
plus “proof of the injurious effect of such acts is presumptive
299

California has two state statutes prohibiting unfair business practices,
while Oklahoma has one. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 598.1-598.11 (West
2004); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101 (West 2004); CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17210 (West 2004).
300
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101 (West 2004).
301
Id. §§ 17200-17210 (West 2004).
302
See STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN
CALIFORNIA (2004), at http://ag.ca.gov/antitrust/publications/antitrust.pdf
(noting that its antitrust enforcement helps both consumers and businesses).
303
See McCall, supra note 182, at 312.
304
See id at 311-12. For example, the California Unfair Pricing Act
specifically prohibits the use of loss leaders by retailers. Id. This is a notable
omission from federal antitrust legislation, and one that hurts federal small
business antitrust plaintiffs. Id.
305
Id. at 316. Section 17026 of the UPA sets forth its definition of “cost.”
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17026 (West 2004). For a complete discussion of
average total cost and other variations, see supra Part I.V.B.
306
McCall, supra note 182, at 316. A California state court decided that as
long as the cost formula is related to legislative intent to prevent monopolistic
behavior, the California UPA may set forth a different standard than the federal
antitrust statutes. See Turnbull & Turnbull v. ARA Transp., Inc., 219 Cal. App.
3d 811 (1990).
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evidence of the purpose or intent to injure competitors or destroy
competition.”307 This rebuttable presumption eases the burden of
proof for the plaintiff, while allowing the defendant to rebut the
presumption by showing that the below-cost pricing was due to
good faith mistake.308
The greatest advantage a California antitrust plaintiff enjoys
over a New York plaintiff stems from California UPA section
17044, which defines and prohibits the use of loss leaders in
product pricing.309 Section 17030 defines a loss leader as “an item
sold at less than cost where: (a) the purpose of the seller is to
induce the purchase of other merchandise, or (b) the effect is a
tendency to deceive purchasers, or (c) the effect is to divert trade
from or injure competitors.”310 Because large national retailers
often establish dominance within a market by below-cost, loss
leader pricing, a revision to the New York antitrust legislation that
adopts California’s prohibition on loss leader pricing would benefit
potential plaintiffs.311 With an expanded New York antitrust
statute, a small business owner could press the Attorney General to
bring suit against retailers such as Home Depot, Kmart, and WalMart to preserve fair competition and the integrity of New York
City’s retail market.312
New York Governor George Pataki and Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer must recognize the need for stronger state-level antitrust
legislation within New York. Existing federal antitrust statutes and
New York’s Donnelly Act are insufficient to protect small
businesses. The weaknesses of New York’s antitrust regime are
307

CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17071 (West 2004).
McCall, supra note 182, at 333.
309
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17044 (West 2004).
310
McCall, supra note 182, at 337 (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §
17030 (West 2004)).
311
See Bianco & Zellner, supra note 38 (discussing the market dominance
of Wal-Mart and its retail tactics).
312
If New York were to model its statute after those of California or
Oklahoma and prohibit loss leader, small business plaintiffs may be able to
obtain injunctions against big box retailers for below-cost pricing like those in
Star Fuel Marts. Star Fuel Marts v. Murphy Oil USA, No. Civ.-02-202-F, 2003
WL 742191 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 29, 2003). For a complete discussion of Star Fuel
Marts, see supra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
308
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amplified by the pro-big business orientation of the state and
federal judiciary following the Supreme Court’s decision in Brooke
Group.313 Although the Federal Trade Commission and U.S.
Department of Justice have jurisdiction to prosecute alleged
violations of federal antitrust legislation, state antitrust
enforcement offers unique advantages.314 States understand their
local conditions and have the opportunity to bring suits as a public
entity against violators of the statutes.315 Thus, states can better
tailor their antitrust legislation to suit the needs of local markets
and can selectively enforce the legislation when necessary in order
to better benefit the public good.316
CONCLUSION
Over the past one hundred years, American antitrust litigation
has developed into an intricate, multi-tiered system.317
Applications of federal and state statutes have varied in type and
scope. The federal predatory pricing plaintiff faces serious judicial
obstacles, but states are in a distinct position to provide relief.318
The nation now has a legal and institutional framework that
provides states with “the jurisdiction and the capacity to prosecute
313

509 U.S. 209 (1993).
First, supra note 216, at 1004 (discussing the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission and Department of Justice); Id. at 1040 (noting the unique
public policy perspective that states bring to antitrust enforcement).
315
Id. at 1040. See Cavanagh, supra note 219, at 41-42. Cavanagh believes
that “where state interests are pre-eminent, prosecutions by the state are more
likely to be effective” at protecting consumers’ interests for two reasons. Id. at
41. First, “state officials are closer to the action than federal officials and would
normally be advanced than their federal counterparts on the learning curve.” Id.
Second, “state involvement from the outset is likely to be more efficient, since
federal enforcers are apt to enlist significant state resources in any event.” Id. at
42.
316
It is essential to note that state antitrust enforcement has its opponents.
See Posner, supra note 287, at 925.
317
See supra Part I.V. for a discussion of the intersection among the
various federal and state antitrust statutes and their different proscriptions.
318
See Peterson, supra note 2, at 341 (relating how courts fear that
plaintiffs may use federal antitrust legislation for improper ends).
314
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violations of both federal and state antitrust law.”319 Zoning and
environmental law options do not offer the same advantages as the
adoption of a strong, specific antitrust statute.320 New York’s
legislature should take advantage of opportunities to fortify the
state’s antitrust regime and protect the state’s small business sector
while preserving New York City’s character.
The phenomenon of sprawl is no longer exclusive to rural
areas. Although it is traditionally a concern of suburbs and rural
areas, one land use and environmental attorney notes that “the loss
of neighborhood character and open space are consistent problems
faced by New York City” following the entrance of big box
retailers.321 Manhattan is known for its wide variety of small shops
and businesses.322 However, as big box retailers enter New York
City’s market, Manhattan grows closer to losing the unique retail
landscape that residents and historians have come to treasure. Each
time a big box store opens its doors, more Manhattanites are
tempted to embrace the convenience that such a store offers— a
result that will homogenize the borough and permanently change
its feel. Although one big box store does not signal the end of
Manhattan as we know it, one on each block just might.

319

First, supra note 216, at 1040.
See infra Parts V(A) and V(B) for a discussion of the shortfalls of
zoning and environmental law in protecting communities against big box retail
development.
321
Christopher Rizzo, Protecting the Environment at the Local Level: New
York City’s Special District Approach, 13 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 225, 228
(2002).
322
POINT OF PURCHASE, supra note 12, at 65. Until the time that discount
superstores came to Manhattan, “shopping in the city’s residential
neighborhoods was an intensely personal experience. You shopped for each item
in a small, specialized, independently owned store, whose owner usually had a
story, and hearing that story was part of the experience of both living in the
neighborhood and shopping there.” Id.
320

